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exploiting leadership deaths from natural causes that successful autocracies appear to 
have found ways for selectorates to nominate successors without losing power - a 
feature which is also consistent with the theoretical approach. 
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1 Introduction
One of the goals of political economy is to understand how institutional
arrangements shape policy outcomes and human well-being. A large litera-
ture has now emerged which studies aspects of this. For the most part this
has concentrated on studying democratic institutions where elections are the
main institution that shapes policy choices. However, throughout most of
human history, elections have served a fairly modest role. Far more common
are systems based on coercive power such as monarchies, military dictator-
ships or one party rule where elections are either a veil or non-existent.
Recent history has seen a signicant move towards open and free elec-
tions as a means of determining who should hold power. The case for such
institutional arrangements is partly based on liberal values that emphasize
the political freedoms that such institutions embody. Indeed, this intrinsic
case for democracy, emphasized by Sen (1999), would stand regardless of
whether it delivered concrete policy benets to its citizens. But the case for
democracy would be cemented further if there were demonstrable benets in
terms of outcomes.
A key observation which motivates this paper is that autocratic govern-
ment is not always a disaster in economic terms. Indeed, throughout history
there has been growth and development in autocratic systems of government.
For example, the British industrial revolution predates the introduction of
free and fair elections with mass participation. Modern China is also a case
in point with a spectacular growth performance in a non-democratic setting.
Whether these observations damage the instrumental case for democracy is
moot. After all, it is the counter-factual that matters  growth and de-
velopment might have preceded at a greater pace were democracy present.
But it is equally clear that whether one looks at democracy or autocracy
there is a great deal of heterogeneity in their performance that cries out for
explanation.
This fact is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows estimated density func-
tions for real GDP per capita growth rates among autocratic and democratic
regimes that lasted ve full calendar years or longer.1 A regimeis dened
1The density functions are estimated by using the Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth
that minimizes the mean integrated squared error. Including regimes that lasted less
than ve years does not change the distributions substantially except for the inclusion
of democratic regimes that existed less than 3 years, which tend to perform very badly
(growth rates less than -1 percent).
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as a period in which authority characteristics of a country stay the same, ac-
cording to the POLITY IV data set.2 Regimes are democratic if the Polity
score is positive, and autocratic if it is non-positive.3 The striking fact that
we will explore in more detail is that the distribution of autocracies has fatter
tails there are more very good autocracies and more very bad autocracies
compared to democracies.4
The key challenge for students of political economy is to extract lessons
from historical and contemporary experience about what makes government
work in the general interest of its citizens. There is little doubt that building
infrastructure, managing macro-economic policy, facilitating private trade
and investment and protecting the vulnerable are all facilitated by e¤ective
government. In this paper, we will focus somewhat narrowly on the issue
of why autocracy can sometimes be successful. This project is not intended
as a defense of autocracy, but as means of gaining further insights into the
institutional basis of good government. It also contributes to broader discus-
sions about the di¤erences in policy and performance between democracies
and autocracies.
The main focus of the paper is on the institutions that make government
accountable  specically nding a means of removing poorly-performing
leaders from o¢ ce. Democracies organize this through regularized contests
for power in elections. However, the means of achieving accountability are
more murky in autocratic settings. The analysis emphasizes accountability
from a selectorate comprising insiders who have the ability to depose a
leader.5 We show that autocratic government works well when the power
of the selectorate does not depend on the existing leader remaining in o¢ ce.
The framework can be used to contrast the performance of autocracy and
democracy in terms of accountability of leaders.
We then turn to identifying successful autocracies empirically. We look
at a variety of methods and use these to pick out regimes that are robustly
high performers. This sample of regimes provides a structured basis for some
case study analysis. We are also able to looking statistically at the patterns
2Section 4 provides details.
3The shapes of the two estimated density functions are similar if we dene a democratic
regime as its Polity score being more than 5, as Fearon (2007) does.
4Rodrik (1997, 2000), Almeida and Ferreira (2002), and Glaeser et al. (2004, Table 8)
make similar observations although the unit of observation in their analysis is a country
rather than a regime.
5The term selectorateis borrowed from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
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of successful autocracies across countries. We then examine the idea that
successful autocracies are able to generate accountability mechanisms in the
absence of open contests for power.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we review some of the voluminous literature on autocracy and democracy by
both economists and political scientists to set our paper in context. Section
three develops the model. In section four, we look empirically at success-
ful autocracies and how far their incidence can be explained. Section ve
explores links between the theory and the characteristics of successful autoc-
racies. Section six o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Background
The background to this paper is a large body of studies on the way in which
government and the economy interact. The key question for this research
programme known as political economy (or sometimes political economics) is
to understand how policy choices are shaped by institutions. One important
institutional category is whether a countrys political institutions are deemed
to be democratic. While the e¤ect of democratic institutions on policy
choices has been studied for a long time, there has been a surge in interest
among economists in recent years.
Whether the analysis is theoretical or empirical, a precondition for in-
vestigating whether democracy or autocracy matters is to nd some way of
characterizing their di¤erences. From a theoretical point of view, a lot of
attention has been paid to whether a country uses elections to determine who
governs. The literature focuses on two main roles of elections: determin-
ing the pattern of representation (i.e. which groups of citizens hold political
power) and holding politicians to account (i.e. whether the incumbents are
punished for bad policy).
The inuential work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) takes the rst
view, focusing on who controls political o¢ ce and modeling autocracy as
a dictatorship of the rich and democracy as a dictatorship of the poor or
middle classes. As a result, income redistribution is greater under democracy
compared to dictatorship. The second perspective is taken in Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2002, 2003) who are the rst to model accountability in a
framework applicable to non-democratic government. In their theory, given
the total amount of government expenditures, the larger is the selectorate
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whose support is required for the government to stay in power, the higher the
level of public goods provided by the government. Elections imply that the
government requires the support from a large number of citizens to stay in
power. Hence, democracy increases public goods provision. We follow them
in putting weight on the role of the selectorate in shaping policy incentives.
However, our theory gives greater emphasis to the interplay of accountability
and representation issues in making government work.
Elections are conducted di¤erently depending on who can vote, who is
eligible to stand and whether there is open access to institutions like the me-
dia. The widely used Polity data base provides a more continuous measure
of democracy in several categories: how competitive and open the recruit-
ment of chief executives is; to what extent the chief executive is constrained
institutionally; and how competitive and regulated political participation is.
These continuous measures are then aggregated into the single Polity score,
measuring the degree of democracy.6 It is commonplace to use this Polity
score to create a discrete cuto¤ between democracies and autocracies. For
example, Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2007) use a cuto¤ of zero with democ-
racies being those with a positive Polity score. However, Fearon (2007)
prefers a cuto¤ of ve. Since discrete transformations of continuous data
series are always somewhat arbitrary, it is important to test the robustness
of specic empirical results to alternative denitions.7
While elections are a central institution in democracies, there are other
important institutions. One of the indicators in the Polity data set is con-
cerned with the checks and balances on a leader. The executive constraints
variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief executives(Marshall and Jaggers 2005, p.23). The
political economy literature has so far focused on the role of executive con-
straints in conict of interest between policy-makers and citizens (e.g. prop-
erty rights enforcement against government expropriation) and used the exec-
utive constraints variable in that context (e.g. Acemoglu and Johnson 2005,
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005). However, it could also a¤ect how
distributional issues are resolved among citizens.
Mindful of the importance of institutional variation in democracies, Pers-
son and Tabellini (2000, 2003) have explored how institutional variations
6See Marshall and Jaggers (2005) for more detail.
7See Munck and Verkuilen (2002) for a critical comparison on di¤erent democracy
datasets including the Polity data base.
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matter within democracies. The main di¤erences that they focus on are
parliamentary versus presidential forms of government and proportional rep-
resentation versus majoritarian electoral rules. They explore theoretical dif-
ferences between these regimes in terms of representation and accountability.
They also show that policies di¤er across forms of democracy.
The early theoretical political economy literature on autocracy attempts
to explain di¤erent economic performances among autocracies in a model in
which an autocrat maximizes his private consumption subject to the proba-
bility of staying in power. One recurring theme in this literature is what is
known as the stationary banditstheory of dictatorship, rst formalized by
McGuire and Olson (1996).8 The theory argues that if a dictator expects
to stay in power for a long period of time, he has an incentive to promote
economic development because he will then increase his private consump-
tion through increased tax revenues resulting from economic growth. This
mechanism has been incorporated into some subsequent studies of autoc-
racy.9 Our theory does not incorporate the stationary bandits theory in
a strict sense; the dictator in our model has no private gain from choosing
welfare-enhancing policies per se. However, successful autocracies emerge in
our model if the ruling group of citizens are secure in power. In this sense,
we incorporate one feature of the stationary bandits theory the importance
of political stability.
One contentious issue in this literature is how welfare-enhancing policies
a¤ect the probability of a dictators survival. Grossman and Noh (1994) and
Overland et al. (2005) assume that a dictators survival is more likely if he
adopts welfare-enhancing policies. Grossman and Noh (1994) additionally
assume that the probability of survival depends on non-economic factors, ar-
guing that successful autocracies are those whose survival does not depend
signicantly on non-economic factors. Overland et al. (2005) propose that
the dictators survival chance increases with the level of capital accumula-
tion (and therefore depends on growth-enhancing policies). As a result,
8See also section VI of Barro (1990).
9Examples include Overland, Simons, and Spagat (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006), as discussed below. What Acemoglu (2006) calls revenue extractioncorresponds
to this mechanism. Paltseva (2006) incorporates the stationary bandit theory into the
theory of democratization. Azam, Bates, and Biais (2005) argue that autocrats may
refrain from predation to build up their reputation as benevolent so that the gain from
predation in the future will be larger due to increased economic productivity. Caselli
(2006) uses this mechanism to explain the natural resource curse.
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autocracies with a low level of initial capital do not perform well because the
dictator will be removed anyway, failing to reap the benet from increased
tax revenues through economic growth. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) as-
sume that welfare-enhancing policies directly reduce the dictators survival
prospects while increasing the survival chance through competition for power
with a challenger. Consequently, successful autocrats are either those who
are secure enough (so that the stationary bandits theory applies) or those
who face tough competition from a challenger. In the intermediate level of
survival chance, autocrats fail to adopt welfare-enhancing policies because
such policies increase the chance that the autocrat is overthrown.
Our theoretical model will show that whether welfare-enhancing policies
increase the probability of a dictators survival depends on the institutional
features of autocracy. Autocracy with a strong selectorate as modeled here
has some features in common with the notion of a consensually strong state
of Acemoglu (2005). We emphasize the role of institutions that organize
accountability of leaders in the absence of elections.
The political economy literature on autocracy discussed so far fails to
explain why poorly-performing autocrats can stay in power for a long period
of time (e.g. Mobutu in former Zaire). Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier
(2004) develop such a theory, arguing that autocrats can exacerbate the
collective action problem involved in the ousting of leaders, by bribing loy-
alists and punishing coup plotters. This implies that autocracy performs
poorly if natural resource abundance or foreign aid provision allows dicta-
tors to buy o¤ the pivotal group of people. Padro-i-Miquel (2006) o¤ers an
alternative explanation, assuming that only the ruling group of citizens can
replace the leader and that once the leader is replaced, there is a chance for
citizens outside the ruling group to seize power. Consequently, autocrats
expropriate citizens outside the ruling group, and the ruling group cannot
replace poorly-performing autocrats for fear of losing power and being ex-
propriated under new leadership. Our theoretical model below assumes
away the collective action problem in leadership replacement, but incorpo-
rates Padro-i-Miquel (2006)s insight and therefore derives an equilibrium in
which poorly-performing autocrats nevertheless stay in power.
While the above studies treat autocracy as a unitary form of govern-
ment, more recent studies have focused on the internal organization of au-
tocracy. Egorov and Sonin (2006) and Debs (2007) explore the incentive for
an autocrat to keep incompetent cabinet ministers in his government while
Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2007) examine why rich people in auto-
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cratic regimes may want to support a bloated bureaucracy. Myerson (2006)
and Svolik (2006) investigate under what condition an autocrat seeks sup-
port from members of the political elite instead of establishing personal rule.
Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2006) examine an autocrats incentive to restrict
media freedom. These studies all try to endogenize autocratic institutions.10
More sociological approaches in political science have long been aware
of institutional heterogeneity among autocracies.11 However, these are not
easily translated into the kind of empirical di¤erences which can be used for
statistical analysis. Moreover, they are poorly tied into the kinds of theoret-
ical categories that shape policy incentives which can inform measurement.12
The literature on the developmental state(Deyo 1987, Amsden 1989,
Haggard 1990, Wade 1990, Evans 1994) can also be seen as focusing on auto-
cratic institutions which are successful in achieving economic growth. These
studies identify two seemingly contradictory institutional features as key for
understanding economic success: autonomy of the state and constraints that
prevent predatory behavior of the state. Our theory may explain why these
two features of the developmental state can coexist in autocracy: the state is
autonomous only from opposition groups while the ruling group disciplines
the state to avoid it from becoming predatory.
There is a growing empirical literature asking whether democracy or au-
tocracy is superior in terms of economic outcomes. The evidence that
democracy promotes prosperity is neither strong nor robust. Przeworski
10One study close to our model in spirit is Egorov and Sonin (2005), which study how the
types of autocracy (hereditary versus non-hereditary) a¤ect the mode of leadership succes-
sion. Wintrobe (1990, 1998) is an early attempt of formal modeling to compare di¤erent
types of autocracy. Dixit (2006) investigates how the type of an autocrat (benevolent or
predatory) a¤ects how public goods are provided.
11This political sociology literature has produced a wide array of terminology to clas-
sify autocratic regimes. Examples include totalitarianism (Linz 2000), one-party systems
(Huntington and Moore 1970), bureaucratic authoritarianism (ODonnell 1979), sultanis-
tic regimes (Chehabi and Linz 1998), neopatrimonialism (Bratton and van de Walle 1997,
chapter 2), the rentier state (Beblawi and Luciani 1987), and, perhaps most recently, com-
petitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002). Geddes (1999) classies autocracies
into personal, military, and single-party rules to investigate how the type of autocracy
a¤ects its duration and the way it terminates. Haber (2006) attempts to bridge the gap
between this political sociology literature and the political economy approach by classi-
fying autocracies into three types according to the way dictators stay in power: terror,
cooptation, and organizational proliferation.
12An exception is Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), who try to nd the determinants of
institutional choices in autocracy by linking a theory of autocracy to data.
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and Limongi (1993) review early empirical research on the e¤ect of democ-
racy on economic growth, concluding that the correlation is weak and not
robust. Persson and Tabellini (2006) try a novel econometric approach nd-
ing some support for the proposition that persistent democracy is associated
with improvements in economic performance. Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2005) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) nd that democratization is associ-
ated with subsequent growth. Jones and Olken (2005) nd that economic
growth rates change signicantly when autocratic leaders are unexpectedly
removed from o¢ ce while such changes are less clear under democracy. Pers-
son and Tabellini (2007) nd evidence of heterogeneity with transitions out
of democracy being damaging to growth, while transitions into democracy
out of autocracy are less clearly marked by improved growth performance.
Which aspects of policy making and human well-being are promoted by
democracies is also a subject of debate. For example, Mulligan et al. (2004)
nd few cross-country di¤erences between socio-economic policies enacted in
democracies and autocracies. On the other hand, Persson (2005) nds that,
conditional on country xed e¤ects, democracy with a parliamentary system
of government or a proportional representation electoral system enacts more
open trade policy than autocracies. Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) nd that
there is a strong and robust cross-country correlation between democracy
and life expectancy while this correlation is not very robust to controlling for
country xed e¤ects. Kudamatsu (2006), in turn, nds that the mortality of
infants born to the same mother drops after democratization in sub-Saharan
Africa in the 1990s.
Pretty much all prior empirical e¤orts to contrast the performance of
democracy and autocracy treat the latter as a homogeneous institution.13
But, as we have seen, heterogeneity in the working of autocratic institutional
arrangements comes out of a broad range of theoretical treatments. A key
aim of this essay is to explore one dimension of this.
13An important exception is Gandhi (2003a,b), who nds that autocracies with legis-
latures and/or political parties, compared to those without, have better economic perfor-
mance, more spending on education and less on the military. The nding that a certain
degree of institutionalization of autocracy yields better development policies and outcomes
is broadly consistent with our theory.
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3 The Model
We lay out a simple agency model of autocracy which studies the incentives of
an incumbent policy maker to implement a costly action that yields benets
to all citizens. It di¤ers from a standard model of democracy as in Besley
(2006, chapter 3) in that there is no regularized contest for public o¢ ce.
We begin by assuming that such contests only arise when the ruling group
replaces its leader. We will show that this institutional feature can lead
to autocracy working in the interests of all citizens (section 3.1). After
discussing the robustness of our results (section 3.2), we compare the outcome
of this model with a stylized representation of democracy where power is
contested regularly (section 3.3).
The world comprises N citizens each of whom belongs to either group A
or B. Group A comprises a fraction  of the population. There are two
time periods denoted by t 2 f1; 2g. In each period, there is a policy maker
in o¢ ce who is a member of one of the two groups of citizens. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the period one policy maker is from group A.14
The policy maker in o¢ ce in period t makes two policy decisions. The
rst is a discrete general interestpolicy denoted by et 2 f0; 1g. This could
be thought of as a wealth creation decision for the citizens which requires
the policy maker to forego private benets such as bribery by a special in-
terest. The payo¤ to citizens and the policy maker from this policy depends
on a state of the world, st 2 f0; 1g ; which is only observed by the policy
maker. Each state occurs with equal probability. Citizens and the policy
maker receive a payo¤ if et = st and zero otherwise.
The second policy decision is purely distributive. This divides an exoge-
nous revenue of size T between the groups. Let Jt 2 [; ] denote the
fraction of this revenue allocated to group J 2 fA;Bg in period t. In the
most extreme case  = 1 and  = 0. However, institutionalized checks and
balances may limit this possibility.
As well as having a group identity, each policy maker is either good or
bad. This is not observed by the citizens. Let  be the probability that a
randomly picked individual from either group is good.15 Both types of policy
makers receive  as a citizen if they choose et = st. However, a good policy
14Whether group A is in the majority does not a¤ect our analysis.
15We require that  > 0. However,  could be very small and many people plainly
believe that it is in many practical settings. The key issue, however, is that the possibility
of a good policy maker existing creates a role for signalling.
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maker gets the payo¤ of 0 by choosing et 6= st. We think of this as having a
moral stance so that they get no utility from earning rents. Hence, a good
politician will always act in the interests of all citizens on the general interest
issue. A bad politician gets a private benet of r from picking et 6= st, where
r is drawn independently each period from a distribution whose cumulative
distribution function is G (r) with E(r) = , G() = 0, and G (r) > 0 for
r > .16 Denote the realized value of the rent available in period t by rt.
A fraction of the citizens in each group is enfranchised, i.e. are endowed
with the power to inuence the choice of policy maker when there is a contest
for power. Let n  N be the total number of enfranchised citizens, of which
a fraction  belongs to group A. Enfranchised citizens from the ruling group
(A) decide whether to retain the incumbent as the policy maker for period
two. If they so choose, then the incumbent remains in power. However,
if group As enfranchised citizens decide to replace the incumbent, there is
an "open" contest between two candidates, one from group A and the other
from group B. Following Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), we refer to group
As enfranchised citizens as the selectorate:17
Suppose that in the event of an open contest, group As candidate has
the support of a fraction  of the enfranchised citizens. We allow for a
uniformly distributed shock to the popularity of group Bs candidate to a¤ect





: The group A candidate then
wins if
 > (1  ) + .
Then the probability that a candidate from groupA wins the contest, denoted
by  (), is:
 () =
8<:





0 if  < 1
4
:
This model conveniently nests the standard probabilistic voting model of
democracy in which all citizens are enfranchised and each citizen has one
16We could think of r as embezzling public funds that are supposed to be spent on
public goods provision. Making  the lower bound on rents guarantees that it is never
possible to motivate a bad policy maker to act in the general interest on the basis of his
personal payo¤ at the current period only.
17As we assume the same preference among citizens of each group, we do not allow
a faction from the selectorate to join with the opposition to topple the regime. This
possibility is interesting as a power struggle within the ruling elite in an autocracy is often
cited as a force leading to democratization (see ODonnell and Schmitter 1986).
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vote. Then if all citizens vote along group identity lines, the probability
that group A wins is  ().18
In an autocratic world, not all citizens are enfranchised (e.g. as in South
Africa during apartheid), in which case  =  if all enfranchised citizens sup-
port their own groups candidate. We also allow for group Bs enfranchised
citizens being repressed by being denied access to polling stations or because
group A monopolizes coercive forces. We represent this simply by a repres-
sion parameter (  1) with  = =(+(1 ))  : If most enfranchised
citizens are from group A (a large ) or if there is strong repression (large
enough ), then  () = 1; i.e. group A is certain to hold onto power in the
second period. This represents the case of an e¤ectively institutionalized
autocracy along the lines of (say) modern day China.
Finally, if the period one policy maker is removed from o¢ ce, he receives
a period two payo¤ as a citizen from group A.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature determines (s1; r1) and whether the period one policy maker is
good or bad. These are private information to the policy maker.
2. The policy maker picks (A1; B1; e1) and period one payo¤s are real-
ized.
3. Members of the selectorate decide whether to retain the policy maker.
4. If the policy maker is removed from o¢ ce, then nature determines
whether two candidates in an open contest are good or bad. An open
contest then ensues in which enfranchised citizens of groups A and B
decide which candidate to support. The group A candidate wins with
probability  ().
5. Nature determines (s2; r2).
6. The period two policy maker chooses (A2; B2; e2) and period two pay-
o¤s are realized.
18The purpose of making the contest outcome probabilistic is to allow the probability
of group As candidate winning to be between 0 and 1 even if the size of support for
candidate A exceeds that for B. With a nite number of citizens in our model, group As
winning probability can be a step function of . This does not a¤ect our analysis because
 only changes discretely in response to the period one policies in our model (see below).
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A key feature of the model is that there is a contest for power only if
the selectorate of group A chooses to replace the current leader. It is the
absence of a guaranteed contest at the end of period one that characterizes
autocracy in the model. Below, we contrast this with a situation where there
is an election at the end of period one as in the standard agency model of
democracy.
3.1 Equilibrium
We solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of our model. This requires
that, in every period, each type of policy maker behaves optimally given the
contest rule in place. Members of the selectorate use Bayes rule to update
their beliefs on the type of the period one policy maker accordingly and
decide optimally whether to replace the policy maker at the end of period
one.
It is very easy to work out the equilibrium behavior of policy makers in
period two. In terms of the general interest policy, every kind of policy maker
takes his short term optimal action. Thus e2 = s2 for a good politician and
e2 = 1   s2 for a bad politician. In terms of the distributive policy, the
policy maker of group J chooses J2 =  and K2 =  for K 6= J , i.e. giving
the biggest reward that he can to his own group.
Given these period two policy choices, consider the decision of enfran-
chised citizens in an open contest between two randomly chosen candidates
from groups A and B. As the type of candidates is unknown to them, both
candidates will produce  with probability  if elected. Group J citizens
prefer their own groups candidate who will choose J2 =  to the other
groups candidate who will choose J2 = . Therefore, all group A enfran-
chised citizens support the group A candidate while all group B enfranchised
citizens support the group B candidate, implying that the share of support
that a group A candidate receives is =(+(1 )). The probability that
group A retains power in an open contest is therefore:
(=(+ (1  )))   (; ):
This probability is key to understand whether autocracy is successful.
Turning now to period one, the distributive policy is again straightfor-
ward. As the period one policy maker is a member of group A, he will set
A1 =  and B1 = . Good policy makers always make the right decision
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on the general interest policy so that e1 = s1. The only issue concerns how
bad policy makers behave. To work out the bad policy makers incentive to
produce , we must compare his payo¤s from the good and bad actions. If
he stays in power, his expected period two payo¤ is +T . If he is removed
from o¢ ce, then he will get the payo¤ of a group A citizen:  + T with
probability  (; ), and + T with probability 1   (; ).
Let  () be the probability that the period one policy maker will stay in
o¢ ce if he produces a payo¤ of  2 f0;g from the general interest policy.
The bad policy makers period two payo¤ from producing a payo¤ of  to
the citizens in period one is:19
 () (+ T ) + (1   ()) [+  (; )T + (1   (; ))T ] :
Using this, it is easy to see that the bad policy maker will produce the good
action in period one if:
[ ()   (0)] [  + (1   (; )) (   )T ] +  > r1:
Consequently, the probability that a bad policy maker chooses the right
general interest action in period one, denoted by , is
 = G([ ()   (0)] [  + (1   (; )) (   )T ] + ).
The bad politician is motivated to choose the right general interest policy by
two sources of future rents. The rst is the personal rent  that he earns.
The second is the group specic rent (   )T . The latter is relevant only
if his group may lose o¢ ce in an open contest, i.e. if  (; ) < 1:
To understand  ()    (0), we need to examine the behavior of the
group A selectorate. Observe that if the policy maker generates , then it
is always optimal to retain him. He creates higher group specic rents from
the redistributive policy (strictly so if  (; ) < 1), and there is a higher
probability of good behavior than would arise in an open contest. To see
the second point, the posterior probability that the incumbent policy maker
is good having produced the good outcome in period one (by Bayes rule) is:

 + (1  ) ,
19Note that  (; ) does not depend on . This is because in an open contest both
candidates are equally likely to be good. Group B enfranchised citizens, therefore, only
care about the distributional policy and always support their own candidate regardless of
. This is no longer the case if an open contest ensues even when the selectorate of group
A prefers keeping the incumbent in o¢ ce. See section 3.3 below.
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which is at least as large as . Therefore, we have  () = 1. If the policy
maker does not generate , then the selectorate will re him if:
(1   (; )) (   )T < :
Thus  (0) = 0. Poor quality policy makers will be red as long as the
selectorate has a su¢ cient grip on power so that they will keep their group
specic rents if they decide to replace the policy maker. Otherwise  (0) =
1.20
For notational simplicity, dene   (   )T , which captures the degree
of salience of the distributional policy. The above discussion then leads us
to the following result:
Proposition 1 In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the probability
that a bad policy maker picks the right general interest action in period one
is given as follows:
1. If (1   (; ))  <  then:
 = G (  + (1   (; ))  +) : (1)
2. If (1   (; ))    then:
 = 0: (2)
This result says that the selectorate will be able to discipline policy makers
in autocracy leading to a good general interest policy choice if their grip on
power is su¢ ciently strong. If not, they will fear that removing the policy
maker will trigger a contest in which the other group can seize power.21
This suggests that successful autocracies will tend to be those with strong
selectorates who can commit to removing bad leaders.
The case where  (; ) = 0 is interesting here and could be thought of as
a case of personal rule where the selectorates grip on power is dependent on
20We assume that if
(1   (; )) (   )T = ;
then the selectorate chooses to retain the incumbent.
21Padro-i-Miquel (2006) uses the same logic to analyze why African dictators have im-
plemented ine¢ cient policies.
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the specic policy maker remaining in power. If   , then personal rule
in this sense will always result in  = 0. This is because the accountability
mechanism via the selectorate has no bite. This accords with intuition
and often-made empirical claim that personal rule is not conducive to good
government. We develop a case study to illustrate this in section 5.3 below.
The role of checks and balances ( ) in disciplining autocrats turns out
to be subtle. First, if group A retains power for sure ( (; ) = 1), there is
no role for constraints on the distributional policy making in improving the
quality of government. The complete lack of checks and balances could still
lead to good policy outcomes if the selectorate is securely in power. Other-
wise, improvements in checks and balances have a non-monotonic impact on
the incentive of autocrats to make a good policy. On one hand, improve-
ments in checks and balances make the case of successful autocracies more
likely. On the other hand, once checks and balances start disciplining bad
politicians, further improvements in checks and balances actually undermine
their incentive to take the good action. This is because a high level of checks
and balances makes an autocrat less concerned about the seizure of power
by group B as a result of his bad performance. Finally, if we compare two
autocracies with the same level of checks and balances, we could see a stark
di¤erence in performance between the two, depending on how salient the
distributional issue is due to the size of T .
As we observed above, a key feature of our model is the assumption
that a contest for power is triggered only if there is a decision to replace
the leader in period one. The role of this assumption can now be assessed.
Suppose instead that there is a probability  that a contest ensues even if the
selectorate chooses to retain the incumbent. The incumbent then competes
with a challenger from group B for o¢ ce in period two. This does not change
the optimal strategy of enfranchised citizens in the contest if (1  ) <  .22
However, it weakens the incentive of the leader in case 1 of the Proposition
since we would now have:
 = G ([ (; ) + (1  )][  + (1   (; ))  ] + )
22This condition implies that the policy makers group membership is the salient issue
if there is a contest for power. Were this not the case, then the group B enfranchised
citizens would be content to support a group A incumbent who had taken the good general
interest action in period one if there were a contest for power at the end of period one.
Thus a guaranteed contest would strengthen incentives for good behavior in an autocracy
as it does in the analysis of democracy with low polarization presented below.
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which is decreasing in . Thus the model predicts that, conditional on having
an e¤ective selectorate disciplining the leader, political stability (low ) is an
asset. This o¤ers a perspective on autocracy that is reminiscent of Olson
(1993) who put weight on the power of longer time horizons in improving the
quality of government within autocracy.23 However, the exact mechanism
in which political stability induces a better quality of autocratic government
is di¤erent. In Olson (1993)s theory, political stability allows an autocrat
to internalize the benet from good economic policies through an increased
amount of tax revenue. In our model, political stability allows the selectorate
to discipline an autocrat who otherwise chooses bad policies for his private
gains.
3.2 Repression and Bribery of the Selectorate
The basic model assumes that the selectorate is powerful enough to replace
the leader if they want to. But autocratic leaders frequently take actions to
entrench their power. If such actions were costless, then the leader would
always would stay in o¢ ce while setting  = 0. However, in reality, such
tactics whether repression by force or bribery are costly. We now explore
the implications of this to illustrate how the good performance of autocracy
in Proposition 1 is dependent on limits on actions by incumbents to entrench
their power.
Assume that the period one policy maker can pay a cost b > 0 to re-
press the selectorate when the latter wishes to remove him from power. If
(1   (; ))  < , then the bad policy maker prefers repression to choos-
ing the bad policy and being ousted as long as the cost of repression is not
too high, specically:
b <   + (1   (; )) .
Under this condition, the bad policy maker will choose repression if:
r1   b > :
As a result, the probability that the bad leader chooses the good policy is
 = G ( +min fb;   + (1   (; )) g) :
23This idea is later formalized in McGuire and Olson (1996).
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It is clear from this that possibility of repression (weakly) reduces the inci-
dence of good period one behavior under autocracy. Thus if b = 0 (costless
repression), then  = 0 and we are back to the case of bad autocracy (case
2 in Proposition 1).
Bribery to stay in o¢ ce is also a possibility. Suppose that the policy
maker can make a transfer to each member of the selectorate in exchange for
supporting him to stay in o¢ ce after he has taken the bad action. Then he
may prefer this strategy to taking the good action if the bribe that he would
have to pay is small enough. The total cost of bribing the selectorate is:
n [  (1   (; ))  ] :
This makes bribery preferable if:
[  (1   (; ))  ] (1 + n) < :
This is more likely to be satised when the selectorate is small the result
in Proposition 1 still holds for large enough n. This case, in particular,
emphasizes that it need not be the benevolence of the selectorate that drives
good autocracy but having a large enough group to make bribery unattrac-
tive.
This extension further emphasizes the need for an e¤ective group to man-
age leadership transitions. To the extent that prevention of repression and
bribery can be institutionalized, we expect autocracy to work better. This
analysis also makes clear that  (the future value of staying in o¢ ce) is im-
portant in shaping incentives. Severe punishments for poorly performing
leaders after they leave o¢ ce are doubled-edged. On one hand, they im-
prove incentives if repression and bribery are absent. On the other, they
increase the incentive to use malign tactics to stay in o¢ ce. Thus the model
shows why negotiating attractive exit arrangements for bad leaders could
sometimes improve policy outcomes.
3.3 Comparison with Democracy
We now contrast the model above with a stylized representation of democ-
racy. This is a non-trivial comparison since it is well-known from the litera-
ture on political agency models (see, for example, Besley 2006) that elections
are an imperfect way of providing incentives for good policies.
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Now assume that all citizens are enfranchised with each having one vote:
n = N ,  = , and  = 1.24 The key feature of democracy that we model
here is a guaranteed contest for power at the end of period one even when
group A citizens prefer retaining the incumbent policy maker. The timing
of the game is the same except for steps 3 and 4, which are now as follows:
3. Citizens from group A decide whether to support the incumbent policy
maker or a randomly picked citizen from group A whose type (good or
bad) is unobservable to citizens (i.e. a primary election).
4. All citizens decide which candidate to support, the group A candidate
chosen in step 3 or a randomly picked citizen from group B whose type
(good or bad) is unobservable to citizens. The group A candidate wins
with probability  ().
The remaining structure of the game is otherwise the same as before.
If group A citizens decide not to support the incumbent in a primary
election, the electoral outcome that follows is exactly the same as that of an
open contest in the model of autocracy with group As winning probability
being  (; 1) = (). The di¤erence comes from a case in which group
A citizens decide to support the incumbent in a primary election. This
case emerges if the incumbent takes a good action in period one, because
otherwise group A citizens are strictly better o¤ by replacing the incumbent
with a randomly picked candidate.25 A key issue in a democracy concerns
24If  > 1, the model of democracy in this subsection can be that of what Levitsky and
Way (2002) call competitive authoritarianism, a regime in which elections with universal
su¤rage are regularly held with opposition groups systematically harassed so that the
number of e¤ective votes per person is less than one for opposition groups.
25To see this, let (0) be the probability that the incumbent who did not produce 
wins in an election, and (00) be the probability that a randomly picked group A candidate
wins. Group A citizensexpected period two payo¤ is
(0)T + (1  (0))(+ T )
if they let the incumbent run for re-election, and
+ (00)T + (1  (00))T
if they support a randomly picked candidate. Therefore, they prefer kicking out the
incumbent in a primary election if
(0)+ [(00)  (0)](   )T > 0.
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whether citizens from group B reward the group A incumbent for taking the
general interest action. This depends on how salient is the general interest
policy relative to the distributional policy.
We rst look at the case in which the distributional policy is more salient:
(1  ) < :
This condition says that group B voters will always support a candidate from
their own group even if the group A candidate is known to be good. In this
case, the share of votes the incumbent undertaking a good action in period
one obtains will be  = . Consequently, if a bad incumbent chooses a
good policy so that group A citizens support him in a primary election, his
expected period two payo¤ is
()(+ T ) + (1  ())(+ T ).
If he chooses a bad policy, he will be removed in a primary election and his
expected period two payo¤ is therefore
()(+ T ) + (1  ())(+ T ).
Comparing these two payo¤s, it is straightforward to see that the probability
that a bad incumbent chooses a good action is
 = G (()(  ) +) : (3)
Since group B citizens are not responsive to the policy makers reputation,
only private rents motivate good behavior. This is because the distribution
of group specic rents does not depend on which general interest policy is
adopted in period one. In addition, private rents are discounted by the
probability of re-election, (), which can be less than one. The regularized
contest for power coupled with the lack of responsiveness by group B citizens
even undermines the motivation of policy makers stemming from private
gains.
We next turn to a situation where the general interest policy is more
salient:
(1  )  
(00) is always equal to (). (0) is also equal to () if group A never supports group
B candidate (i.e.  < (   )T ). If group A prefers group B candidate to a bad group
A politician (i.e.   (   )T ), (0) = 0. Therefore, the above inequality always
holds.
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We will look at the best performance of democracy that can be sustained in
this case. Suppose that all group B citizens will support a candidate from
group A who takes the good action in period one. Then, the outcome is
equivalent to the good autocracy case in section 3.1. It is straightforward
to see that
 = G (  + (1  ())  +) : (4)
Good behavior by the period one policy maker is now rewarded with personal
rents in period two for sure and by an increase in the probability of retaining
group specic rents. This will be an equilibrium consistent with Bayes rule
provided that at this value of :


(1  ) (1  )
 + (1  )

 >  ,
which will always hold for a su¢ ciently low value of  .26
We now compare the performance of autocracy and democracy in terms
of the probability of disciplining the bad incumbent. Table 1 shows which
political system is better in each of four main parameter regions. When
26If this condition does not hold, then there will be a mixed strategy equilibrium with
a lower level of . This is a little tricky as it is not entirely obvious how to put mixed






 + (1  ) ^
35 = 















 ] + 

where  () < 1 is the probability of re-election given that the incumbent has produced .
Since all group B voters are, by construction, indi¤erent between group A and group B
candidates at ^, we suppose that a proportion  of the group B voters support the group





=  ( + (1  )  (1  ) (1  )) :
The key observation is that any equilibrium where  = ^, must have less good behavior by
the leader so that the equilibrium behavior in (4) is an upper bound on the performance
of democracy consistent with the level of checks and balances in place.
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the distributional issue is of little importance (a very small  as in the top-
left cell), democracy performs better as long as () <  (; ) (compare
equations (1) and (4)), i.e. power is more contestable in a democracy. Thus
democracy is better in so far as it strengthens the power of the opposition
and increases the group specic rent that motivates a bad politician to stay
in o¢ ce.
When the distributional issue is very important (a very large  as in
the bottom-right cell in Table 1), we see, by comparing equations (2) and
(3), that democracy performs better as long as democratic competition does
not entirely prevent group A from holding power (() > 0). When the
distributional issue is very salient, the selectorate in autocracy is unable to
discipline the policy maker. However, in democracy the fact that group A
citizens regularly face competition from group B allows them to discipline a
bad politician.
Which of the o¤-diagonal cells in Table 1 is the relevant parameter region
depends on the size of  (; ). If (1 )(1  (; ))  , then the bottom-
left cell is relevant. In this case, democracy always performs better (compare
(2) and (4)). In this case,  (; ) is not large enough for the selectorate to
credibly threaten to remove a bad politician if he behaves badly. On the
other hand, in democracy, group B citizens are responsive to the policy
makers good behavior, giving the incumbent an incentive to behave well.
Broader political participation in a democracy is benecial in this case.
If  (; ) is large enough so that (1  )(1   (; )) < , we are in the
top-right cell in which autocracy performs better than democracy (compare
(1) and (3)). In this case, the distributional issue is relatively important,
making group B citizens unresponsive to the good action by the incumbent.
In a democracy, this unresponsiveness undermines a bad politicians incentive
for good action. In an autocracy, however, group B has very little inuence
on leadership selection due to a high  (; ). This exclusion of group B from
political participation creates an incentive for a bad politician to undertake
good policy because group A does not fear losing power after replacing the
leader.
The above analysis suggests that, as long as the selectorate has a strong
hold over power, autocracy is a better form of government if the distrib-
utional issue is neither too salient nor too irrelevant. In all other cases,
however, democracy is a better form of government, at least under the plau-
sible condition that 0 < () <  (; ). Thus, while the approach that we
have taken shows why successful autocracy is a possibility, it is suggestive of
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why democracy is broadly superior in promoting general interest policies.
While the analysis is very simple indeed, it gives a novel take on the
di¤erence between autocracy and democracy in delivering policies. There
is no easy ranking between democracy and autocracy it depends on the
institutional setting and the environment in which system of government is
implemented. For a given level of the salience of the distributional issue
(a xed ), the model suggests a natural ordering among a cross-section of
democracies and autocracies in terms of implementation of general interest
policies. Best of all is responsive democracy where general interest poli-
cies are salient (a large ). Second best is successful autocracy, requiring
an e¤ective selectorate. Next is polarized democracy where elections do
not reward good general interest policies. Worst of all is bad autocracy
where leaders are able to hold on to power regardless of their performance
while in o¢ ce. This could explain the longer lower tail of the performance
distribution among autocracies, as seen in Figure 1.
However, Figure 1 also shows that autocracy has a longer upper tail in the
performance distribution. Our model can explain this by assuming that the
extent of constraints on distributional issues (as proxied by (   )) is lower
in a political system without regularized contests for power. Comparing
equations (1) and (4) reveals that even if () <  (; ), autocracy can
perform better because the policy maker is motivated more by group specic
rents. The lack of constraints on autocratic leaders in making distributional
policies may explain why some autocracies perform better than the best of
all democracies. Thus there are likely to be important interaction e¤ects
between the di¤erent dimensions of government institutions as measured in
data sets like POLITY IV.
3.4 Discussion
Padro-i-Miquel (2006) is many ways the closest contribution to this paper.
Although it is not discussed explicitly, his model also predicts that secure
power of the selectorate (high  (; )) improves the policy-makers perfor-
mance. What distinguishes our model from his is the e¤ect of institution-
alizing participation by the opposition group in leadership selection. In
Padro-i-Miquel (2006)s model, the institutionalized participation by the op-
position prevents an autocrat from expropriating them at his will, which in
turn reduces the ruling groups fear of losing power and allows them to dis-
cipline the autocrat. In our model, allowing the opposition to participate
23
in leadership selection may not improve the policy choice if the distribu-
tional policy is more salient. The di¤erence stems from our assumption
that distributional policy making depends on checks and balances and the
group identity of the policy maker. Moreover, the contest for power does
not discipline the incumbent in this policy dimension.
The model has deliberately focused on the incidence of common interest
policy decisions in democracy and autocracy. This makes sense as the per-
formance metric that it invokes is uncontroversial. However, it is clear that
the distributional outcomes under all the cases that we have studied may be
quite di¤erent. Thus, there could be a preference for one regime or another
on distributional grounds. For example, in the case of successful autocracy,
power is monopolized by group A and this may not be good from a social
point of view. A more complete treatment of the issues would clearly have
to widen the perspective that we have taken here by taking a stance on a
welfare criterion that pays attention to distributional issues.
We also assumed that the fraction of good politicians  is xed in com-
paring across political regimes. However, the model makes clear that 
can a¤ect the quality of government, both directly in determining whether
good actions are taken and indirectly by changing the political equilibrium.
Besley (2005) emphasizes the importance of selection mechanisms in politi-
cal regimes both in history and comparing contemporary political regimes.
More open access to political life could be an important di¤erence between
autocracy and democracy which would a¤ect the comparison in a way that
is not modeled in our baseline case.27
Perhaps the most interesting possibility for future work is to appraise the
way in which this framework predicts the evolution of institutional choices
over time. We should expect autocracy and democracy to prevail when they
are successful. Thus there should be a bias (among long-lived regimes) to-
wards cases where (in terms of the model) the equilibrium policy outcomes are
(1) and (4). But for that democracy requires good checks and balances with
general interest policies being more salient. Equally, successful autocracy
requires a strong, hard-to-repress or hard-to-bribe, selectorate. However,
coping with weak checks and balances (and polarization) should be less of
an issue for producing general interest actions in autocracy.
Perhaps the main attraction of the approach taken here is that it gets
27Rauch (2001) can be seen as an attempt to endogenize  in our model in the context
of autocratic regimes.
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the focus on institutional features that shape policy incentives. Within the
connes of institutional variants such as autocracy and democracy, we have
emphasized the sources of heterogeneous outcomes which are typical of the
data.
4 Successful Autocracies?
In this section, we look at autocracies empirically. This analysis serves two
purposes. The rst is to show that there are indeed cases of successful au-
tocracies according to objective criteria. Although we have some sense of
which autocracies are more successful than others (e.g. the Chinese com-
munist regime versus African dictatorships), to the best of our knowledge,
there has been no systematic analysis to identify good autocracies empiri-
cally. The second aim of this section is to identify the cases of successful
autocracy which we will use to investigate the validity of our theory in the
next section. By relying on objective criteria to identify successful autoc-
racies, we avoid arbitrarily selecting only cases that are consistent with our
theory.
To identify successful autocracies, we rst need to decide how to dene an
autocracy empirically. Ideally, the denition should closely follow the char-
acterization of autocracy in our theory: the absence of regularized contest
for leadership. In addition, to capture heterogeneous institutional features
among autocracies, we should separate periods of autocratic rule by the de-
gree of constraints on the executive in making distributional policy (   ),
the proportion of the selectorate among enfranchised citizens (), and the
way enfranchised citizens exercise their power ().
Due to lack of such data covering a long period of time, however, we rely
on the Polity data base (POLITY IV, version 2004) because its coverage of
the sample period is the longest among appropriate datasets. We adopt the
following procedure to divide country-years into autocratic and democratic
regimes. First, for each country, we divide years from 1800 or independence
until 2004 between democratic and autocratic periods according to the Polity
score. The Polity score, ranging from -10 to 10, measures the degree of
democracy.28 If the Polity score is positive, we treat such a year as demo-
28If the Polity score is either -66 (foreign occupation), -77 (anarchy), or -88 (regime
transition periods), we see it as a year without a regime.
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cratic. Years with a non-positive Polity score are autocratic.29 To capture
heterogeneity among autocracies and democracies, we further divide consecu-
tive democratic and autocratic years into di¤erent regimes if there is a change
in authority characteristics according to the Polity data set: the method of
chief executive recruitment (EXREC), the constraint on chief executive (EX-
CONST), and political participation (POLCOMP). These three dimensions
of authority characteristics measured in the Polity data base loosely corre-
spond to institutional features of autocracy in our model: EXREC for the
presence of regularized contest for executive power, EXCONST for checks
and balances on the distributional policy, and POLCOMP for the proba-
bility that the selectorate stays in power when the incumbent is replaced
( (; )).
In sum, we dene a regimeas consecutive years with the same authority
characteristics. A regime is autocratic if its POLITY score is non-positive.
Below, we restrict our attention to regimes that lasted at least ve full cal-
endar years. Autocratic regimes of shorter length may perform very well
simply because of luck or just by inheritinga good performance from the
previous regime.
In the following subsections, we rst identify autocracies successful in
achieving economic growth. We then turn to autocracies successful in hu-
man development: health and education. These two investigations identify
the core set of successful autocracies, successful in at least two dimensions
of performance among the three (growth, health, and education). We check
the robustness of the selection of these autocracies to alternative denitions
of autocracy. Finally, we show that standardexogenous characteristics of
countries identied by the literature on the quality of government and insti-
tutions do not fully predict whether a country has a successful autocracy.
4.1 Economically Successful Autocracies
We measure each regimes economic performance as follows. Suppose that a
regime starts in year s and ends in year t. We calculate the regimes annual
economic growth rate as
lnYt 1   lnYs
t  1  s ; (5)
29See below for the robustness to choosing a di¤erent cut-o¤ value.
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where Yt is real GDP per capita in year t, taken from the Penn World Table
version 6.2 (the variable RGDPCH).30
We then obtain the 80th percentile of the distribution of annual growth
rates among all regimes, including democratic ones (313 in total). We regard
an autocratic regime as successful if its annual growth rate exceeds this 80th
percentile of the distribution.31
Table 2 shows the list of economically successful autocracies obtained by
the above procedure. There are 35 autocratic regimes whose annual growth
rate is above the 80th percentile of the distribution. The list includes East
Asian autocracies well-known for high economic growth such as China, In-
donesia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Dictatorships in
southern Europe are also in the list. On the other hand, there are lesser-
known autocracies as well: a couple of African countries in the 1960s (Gabon
and Togo), those in the Middle East (Iraq in the 1970s, Syria in the 1960s),
communist regimes in East Europe (Poland, Romania), and a few Latin
American countries (Ecuador in the 1970s, Peru and Venezuela in the 1950s).
Overall, the table shows that there are indeed successful autocracies in terms
of economic growth.
Measuring success based on annual growth rates may not be an accurate
way of assessing economic performance of regimes, however. One concern is
that a regimes growth rate may pick up the e¤ect of country characteristics.
Whatever regime may exist, it can be that a countrys economy grows any-
way. Another concern is that an economy under a certain regime may grow
rapidly solely due to the convergence e¤ect if the regime starts with very
low per capita GDP. Finally, a regime may perform well simply because it
succeeds the previous regime which devastated the economy.
To deal with these concerns, we conduct three alternative assessments
of success. First, we subtract the countrys annual economic growth rate
from each regimes growth rate, obtain the 80th percentile of the demeaned
growth rates among all regimes, and check whether autocratic regimes in
30We choose t 1 rather than t as the end year for calculating annual growth rate because
Yt may reect an economic turmoil caused by the regime change and/or the succeeding
regime. In a few cases where the succeeding regime starts on January 1 of the next year,
we use Yt instead of Yt 1. If GDP observations are not available for the entire period of
a regime, we use the rst and/or the last observation to calculate the growth rate. In
doing so, we drop regimes with less than ve years of GDP observations.
31 Note that this procedure would yield very few successful autocracies if most regimes
in the top quintile of the growth distribution were democratic.
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Table 2 are above the 80th percentile. This procedure removes country
xed e¤ectsfrom the measure of performance of each regime. Second, we
group regimes into ve quintiles according to their initial GDP per capita (Ys
in equation (5)), obtain each quintiles average growth rate, subtract it from
each regimes growth rate, calculate the 80th percentile of the demeaned
growth rates among all regimes, and check whether autocratic regimes in
Table 2 are above the 80th percentile. As a result, the convergence e¤ect is
removed from each regimes performance measure. Finally, we discount a
regimes success if it does not survive ten years or longer and if it follows
a three-year period of negative growth (i.e. Ys   Ys 3 < 0), because such a
regime can perform well simply due to a reconstructione¤ect.32
The three columns to the right in Table 2 show the results from these
three robustness checks. Among the 35 successful autocracies, 21 survive
all the robustness checks that are applicable. The rst robustness check
turns out to be tough for East Asian autocracies since these countries grew
consistently over time. Notwithstanding, China since 1976, South Korea in
the 1980s, Thailand in the 1960s, and Indonesia since 1967 survive this test,
proving to be very successful autocracies.
4.2 Autocracies Successful in Human Development
We now turn to human development. To measure success in this sphere, we
rst remove the e¤ect of real GDP per capita by obtaining the residuals from
the following equation estimated for each cross-section of countries in year t:
Ht = + Yt + (Yt)
2 + "t; (6)
where Ht is either life expectancy at birth in year t, obtained fromWorld De-
velopment Indicators (September 2006 edition), or the gross primary school
enrollment ratio in year t obtained from UNESCO Institute for Statistics
(through the EdStats web site maintained by the World Bank).33 We include
32Note that this procedure is not applicable to regimes for which Ys 3 is not available
in the data.
33For life expectancy, years 1960, 1962, 1967, 1970, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1987,
1990, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003, and 2004 are chosen because data for a sizable
number of countries is available for these years. For primary school enrollment ratio, years
1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990-1996, and 1999-2004 are chosen for the same reason. For
Taiwan, we use data taken from the 1987 (for health), 1994 (for education), and 2005 (for
both) issues of Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China.
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the squared term of per capita income as a regressor because health and edu-
cation exhibit a strong non-linear relationship with income in a cross-section
of countries.34 We can interpret the residuals as partly reecting government
e¤orts to promote human development through public health interventions
and developing schooling systems.
We average the residuals for each regime and calculate the 80th percentile
of its distribution among all regimes (307 for health and 275 for education).35
We also perform the rst of the three robustness checks that we conducted for
economic performance (i.e. removing country xed e¤ects). Tables 3 and
4 list successful autocracies in terms of health and education, respectively.
Communist regimes in China, Cuba, Poland, Romania, and Vietnam appear
in these tables. For health, regimes in the Middle East and North Africa
enter the list (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia) while the list
for education includes a number of African regimes.
Figures 2 and 3 show the distributions of the mean residuals across demo-
cratic and autocratic regimes for health and education, respectively. Figure 2
conrms the nding by Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) that democracies have
higher life expectancy than autocracies conditional upon income per capita.
In addition, both gures show that the performance of autocracies is more
heterogeneous than that of democracies for human development.36
4.3 Robustness
In order to identify autocracies that are successful in at least two dimensions
of performance among the three (economic growth, health production, and
education), we assign the score of success to each regime which is equal to the
number of the league tables in which a regime appears. If a regime passes
all the applicable robustness check in each table, one more point is added
to the score in each case. The highest score is, therefore, six. We choose
four as the cut-o¤ because this ensures success in at least two dimensions
34Preston (1975) nds this non-linear relationship for health. It turns out that a similar
non-linear relationship can be found for primary school enrollment.
35In calculating the average residual for each regime, we exclude the residuals in the
rst year of each regime because they may reect political instability caused by regime
change or the achievement by the previous regime.
36The lower tail of the distribution for democracies in Figure 2 (below -15 years) only
includes two regimes: South Africa (since 1994) at -19.3 years and Botswana (since 1997)
at -30 years, both of which su¤er severely from HIV epidemics.
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and at least one robust success. Table 5 shows the list of autocracies whose
score is four or higher. The list includes dictatorships in southern Europe
(Greece, Portugal, and Spain), communist regimes in China, Cuba, Poland,
and Romania, and military dictatorships in Latin America (Brazil, Chile,
and Panama) and in East Asia (South Korea and Thailand).
Below, we check the robustness of this list to alternative denitions of
autocratic regimes.
4.3.1 Denition of Regimes
Our denition of a regimeentirely depends on the coding in the Polity data
base. As the original aim of the Polity data set is to analyze the duration
of regimes (see Marshall and Jaggers 2005, p.3), we have much condence
in the coding of regime change timing in the data set. However, dening
the beginning and end of regimes in a di¤erent way may yield a di¤erent
list of successful autocracies. To check this possibility, we use an alterna-
tive denition of regimes. We rst divide years for each country between
democratic and autocratic periods according to the Polity variable as we did
above. For autocratic periods, we then divide them into di¤erent regimes if
chief executives of government are di¤erent according to the Archigos data
set (version 2.5).37 In other words, an autocratic regime terminates either if
a country is democratized or if a di¤erent person assumes executive power.
Consequently, each autocratic regime now represents one dictator. For a
democratic period, we treat it as one regime, because leadership changes are
so frequent in democracies that many democratic regimes would not survive
ve full calendar years or longer if we divided them by leadership changes.
With this denition of a regime, we conduct exactly the same analysis
as in the previous subsections. Table 6 lists dictators under whose rule
annual economic growth exceeds the 80th percentile of the growth distribu-
tion among all regimes. The table also reports whether human development
performances are above the 80th percentile of the distribution and whether
each autocrat passes the robustness checks. The majority of successful auto-
cratic regimes identied in Table 5 also appear in this table and perform well
in health and/or education, too. Brazil (1965-74) and Thailand (1958-68)
do not appear here because both regimes have relatively frequent leadership
changes and are therefore split into multiple regimes of less than ve full
37Jones and Olken (2007) use this dataset, which is downloadable at Hein Goemanss
website: <http://mail.rochester.edu/~hgoemans/data.htm>.
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calendar years. Chile (1973-81) and Cuba (1961-76) are dropped because
these regimes are part of a dictators long-lived rule (Pinochet and Castro)
and these dictators perform less successfully during the rest of their rule.
As our theory in Section 3 emphasizes the role of leadership changes
under the xed parameters of regime characteristics, we prefer the denition
of regimes according to the authority characteristics coded by the Polity data
set, which allows leadership changes to happen within each autocratic regime.
However, Table 6 shows that the denition of regimes does not a¤ect the list
of successful autocratic regimes substantially.
4.3.2 Denition of Democracy
We dene democracies as regimes with their Polity score being positive. As
Fearon (2007) argues, however, this denition allows some dubious cases
to be classied as democracies. It also does not strictly coincide with the
presence of regularized contest for executive power as our model characterizes
democracy. Table 7 shows the list of regimes whose Polity score is between
1 and 5 inclusive and whose growth rate is above the 80th percentile of the
distribution of all regimes. Ten more regimes now enter the league table
for economic growth. Among them, South Korea (1963-1972) and Greece
(1949-1967) join the core set of successful autocracies in Table 5.
We further check the robustness of our denition of democracy to the use
of a completely di¤erent democracy data set, the one by Przeworski et al.
(2000).38 We dene a regime as a period in which three aspects of political
institutions remain the same: (1) how the chief executive is elected (directly,
indirectly, or not elected by popular elections); (2) how the legislature is
elected (elected by popular elections, not elected, non-existent); and (3) the
number of legal political parties (more than one, one, none).39 A regime is
democratic if all of the following ve conditions are met: (1) the chief execu-
tive is elected directly or indirectly; (2) the legislature is elected by popular
elections; (3) there is more than one legal political party; (4) the current chief
executive will not establish non-party or one-party rule or unconstitutionally
close legislature in subsequent years; and (5) there was, or will be, partisan
power alternation via elections.40 Otherwise a regime is autocratic.
38The dataset was obtained from Jose Cheibubs website in December, 2005.
39These three aspects correspond to variables EXSELEC, LEGSELEC, and PARTY in
their dataset, respectively.
40See Chapter 1 of Przeworski et al. (2000) for details.
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Table 8 provides the list of successful autocracies when we dene demo-
cratic and autocratic regimes in this way. Since Przeworski et al. (2000)s
data ends in 1990, all the autocracies since the 1990s do not appear in this
table.41 Autocracies in Romania, Spain, South Korea, China, Panama, Por-
tugal, and Thailand appear in this table as well though, except for South
Korea, the robustness of their good performances is more tenuous than in
Table 5. Brazil and Greece drop because these two regimes are split into
multiple autocracies according to Przeworski et al. (2000)s coding. Chile
and Poland drop because the less successful period of autocracy (the 1980s)
is now integrated into the same regime. Cuba drops due to the lack of
Przeworski et al. (2000)s coding.
The last three columns in Table 8 show three institutional features of these
successful autocracies according to the coding by Przeworski et al. (2000).
Successful autocracies do not seem to share institutional characteristics in
terms of the way executive o¢ ce and legislature seats are lled and the
number of legal political parties.
4.4 Correlates of Successful Autocracies
In what kind of countries do successful autocracies tend to emerge? In this
section, we seek exogenous characteristics of countries that are correlated
with the incidence of successful autocracies. It turns out that exogenous
country characteristics often used in the literature to explain socioeconomic
performances, on the whole, do not seem to explain (in a statistical sense)
the emergence of successful autocracies.
We estimate the following probit regression for the sample of autocratic
regimes (dened by the Polity data set), to see if any country characteristics
predict successful autocracies:
Pr(SUCCESSkic = 1) = (+Xc + Zic), (7)
where SUCCESSkic is 1 if an autocratic regime i in country c appears in the
list in Table k 2 f2; 3; 4; 5g and 0 otherwise, () is the cumulative distrib-
ution function of the standard normal distribution,  is a constant, and Zic
41The updated versions of Przeworski et al. (2000)s data by Boix and Rosato (2001)
or by Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) do not provide information on disaggregated aspects
of political institutions. Therefore, we cannot exploit heterogeneity across autocracies in
terms of institutional characteristics.
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is a vector of controls including region dummies42 and dummies for decades
(1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) in which regime i emerges. Xc is a vector of
exogenous characteristics of country c that are known as determinants of the
quality of government and institutions in the literature (ethnic fractionaliza-
tion, legal origins, European settlersmortality).
Table 9 shows the results from this analysis. Columns (1) to (3) look at
success in economic growth (k = 2). Column (1) shows that ethnic fraction-
alization, which Alesina et al. (2003) identify as a signicant determinant of
economic growth, does not predict the emergence of successful autocracies.
Column (2) shows that European settlersmortality, which Acemoglu et al.
(2001) argue a¤ects the degree of secure property rights and thus the level
of economic development today, does not predict the economic success of
autocracies, either.
In column (3), we deal with a concern that economically successful au-
tocracies simply reect oil booms. Autocratic regimes in oil producing coun-
tries like Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, UAE,
and Venezuela appear in Table 2. It may be the case that these successful
autocracies simply coincide with periods of high oil prices. We rst identify
net oil exporting countries in 2003 according to International Energy Annual
2004 (Table 3.1).43 Next, we create a dummy variable which is equal to one
if a countrys net oil export is more than 100 barrels per day.44 We also ob-
tain the world crude oil prices (in US dollars per barrel) from International
Financial Statistics (March 2007),45 and deate them by the World Banks
Manufactures Unit Value Index (100 in 1990).46 We then calculate the av-
42East Asia and Pacic, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East and
North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin American and the Caribbean (with Western
Europe - Greece, Portugal, and Spain - omitted). We follow the World Banks classication
of regions.
43See <http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea>. We calculate net oil exports by subtracting the
sum of "crude oil imports" and "total imports of rened petroleum products" from the
sum of "crude oil exports" and "total exports of rened petroleum products".
44We do not use time-variant oil exporter dummies because oil export data does not
date back to the 1950s. The amount of oil export is also likely to be endogenous over
time.
45The average prices of UK Brent (light), Dubai (medium), and West Texas Intermediate
crude oil (line number 00176AAZZF).
46See <http://go.worldbank.org/VDQ5AA3VP0>. The Index measures the price of
developing country imports of manufactures in U.S. dollar terms. We follow Deaton (1999),
who uses this index to deate commodity export price indices.
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erage deated oil price for each autocratic regime and subtract the average
deated oil price during the period between 1960 and 2004 to measure the
extent to which each autocratic regime enjoys an oil price boom. Finally,
we interact the oil exporter dummy with the regime-specic oil price devi-
ation from the 1960-2004 average, and replace Xc in equation (7) with this
interaction term. If the coe¢ cient on this interaction term is positive, then
successful autocracies simply reect the oil price boom that these regimes en-
joy. Column (3) shows that the coe¢ cient is signicantly negative, suggesting
that oil price booms actually make autocracies less likely to be successful.47
If we interpret oil export revenues as the source of distributional conict (a
large T in our model), this nding is consistent with our theory though we
cannot exclude alternative explanations such as Caselli (2006).48
In columns (4) and (5), we look at success in health production (k = 3).
La Porta et al. (1999) nd that ethnic fractionalization and the French
legal origin are positively correlated with infant mortality. Column (4)
shows that autocratic regimes successful in health production tend to be
in countries with lower ethnic fractionalization. Thus the performance of
autocracies in terms of health partly reects the e¤ect of ethnic homogeneity.
However, as a low value of the Pseudo R2 indicates, it is not the whole story.
Column (5) shows that the French legal origin does not explain success of
autocracies in health production. Countries with the socialist legal origin
tend to have autocracies successful in terms of health. This result may be
in line with our theory to the extent that communist regimes tend to have
a strong selectorate. The positive correlation of German legal origin and
success in health is di¢ cult to interpret because only regimes in South Korea
and Taiwan have German legal origin in the sample.
The dependent variable in columns (6) and (7) is success in education
(SUCCESS4ic). La Porta et al. (1999) also nd that ethnic fractionalization
and the French legal origin are negatively correlated with school enrollment.
We do not nd these two exogenous country characteristics are correlated
47The standard deviation of the deated oil price is 12.4 US dollars per barrel. There-
fore, one standard deviation of the oil price decreases the probability of economic success
by 24.8 percentage points for autocracies in oil-exporting countries.
48If we choose the cut-o¤ of 500 barrels per day to create the oil exporter dummy, the
coe¢ cient on the interaction term becomes larger in magnitude. If we choose the cut-o¤ of
0 barrel per day instead, the coe¢ cient is no longer signicant. However, a small amount
of oil exports is unlikely to push up GDP per capita substantially during the period of oil
price booms.
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with success in education among autocracies, either.49
Finally, columns (8) and (9) investigate whether the core set of successful
autocracies identied in Table 5 have any particular characteristics (k = 5).
Since the number of successful autocracies is very limited in these regressions,
a large number of observations are dropped because some decade dummies
and region dummies perfectly predict success. Neither ethnic fractionaliza-
tion nor European settlersmortality is signicantly correlated with success.
Compared to the British legal origin, countries with the French legal origin
are more likely to see successful autocracies, contrary to the negative corre-
lation between the French legal origin and the quality of government, found
by La Porta et al. (1999). Countries with the socialist and German legal
origins are also more likely to have successful autocracies than those with
the British legal origin. Indeed, only Thailand has the British legal origin
among the countries listed in Table 5.
A positive correlation between socialist legal origin and the likelihood
of successful autocracy might seem counter-factual. Our theory implies
that communist regimes are successful to the extent that the ideology of
communism ensures the secure hold of power by the selectorate (typically
top communist party o¢ cials). Perhaps communism encourages groups of
citizens outside the regime to accept autocratic rules while opposition groups
in dictatorships without any ideology nd it hard to accept such rule and thus
pose a signicant threat to the selectorate. Alternatively, the presence of
ideology such as communism may enhance coordination among members of
the ruling group to establish an e¤ective repression mechanism to suppress
the opposition. Either way, our model does not predict that communism per
se breeds success. The later years of Ceausescus rule in Romania (see Section
5.1 below) is an example where a communist regime can be transformed into
personal rule.
49If we re-dene SUCCESSkic for k = 2; 3; 4 by making it zero if regime is success
is not robust, results for economic and educational success do not substantially change.
For health success, the coe¢ cient on ethnic fractionalization is no longer signicant. If
we run OLS regressions with economic growth rates, conditional life expectancy or school
enrollment ratio as the dependent variable, results for educational success do not change.
Ethnic fractionalization and the French legal origin are now negatively correlated with
economic growth and health performance, respectively. These results imply that aside
from top performers, the negative e¤ect of ethnic fractionalization on economic growth
and that of the French legal origin on health outcomes persist among autocratic regimes.
The correlation between the oil price boom and economic success and between ethnic
fractionalization and health success, on the other hand, is no longer signicant.
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These results suggest that the previous literature on the quality of gov-
ernment and institutions cannot fully explain why some autocracies are suc-
cessful in achieving high economic growth, better health, and better educa-
tion. A theory to explain successful autocracies is necessary to make further
progress. We now investigate how well institutional features identied in our
model relate to cases of successful autocracy as identied by this empirical
exercise.
5 Link to the Theory
The previous section identied the core set of successful autocracies. In this
section, we link these autocracies to our theory in Section 3. We rst provide
several case studies of successful autocracies to motivate the institutional
context suggested by our theory. Next, we provide evidence that autocracies
are more likely to be successful if the rate of leadership change is high, which
is consistent with our theory. Finally, we exploit the natural death of leaders
as a natural experiment to see if the selectorates grip on power is indeed
secure in successful autocracies, as predicted by our theory.
5.1 The Selectorate in Successful Autocracies: Some
Case Studies
A core idea in our model is the role of the selectorate in organizing leadership
contests within regimes in successful autocracies. We begin by looking at ve
case studies suggested by Table 5. Of these, we will argue that Brazil (1965-
1974), China (1976-2004), and Romania (1948-1977) appear to be consistent
with our theory. On the other hand, Spain (1939-1975) does not seem
to match very well with our theoretical predictions. Finally, we consider
South Korea (1973-1981). Although this does not seem to t with our
theory either, the advent of this autocratic regime can be explained by our
theoretical framework.
Brazil (October 1965 - January 1974) According to the Polity data
set, the Brazilian military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985 went through three
regime changes in 1965, 1974, and 1982. Tables 2 and 4 reveal that the
second phase was successful in economic development and primary school
enrollment. During this period, Humberto Castelo Branco, Artur da Costa
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e Silva, and Emilio Grrastazu Medici were the chief executives (Presidents)
according to the Archigos data set.
The de facto selectorate of this regime was the armed forces. The national
legislature (Congress) had the formal right to elect President.50 However, it
was only allowed to rubber-stamp the sole presidential candidate presented
by the military both when the presidential term for Castelo Branco came to
an end in 1967 and when Costa e Silva was incapacitated due to a stroke in
1969. In both cases, top military o¢ cers chose a candidate behind whom
the armed forces could be united (Skidmore 1988, pp.18-21, 51-53; Stepan
1971, pp.248-252).
The replacement of Castelo Branco in 1967 appears to be consistent with
our theoretical prediction that the selectorate can oust a poorly-performing
incumbent in a successful autocracy. Kaufman (1979, pp.172-3) argues that
Castelo Brancos economic policy resulted in only a moderate reduction in
ination and that the recession in the industrial southeast showed few signs of
abating. Castelo Branco was determined to step down in 1967 (see Stepan
1971, p.248), but he tried to nominate his successor and prevent Costa e
Silva from assuming o¢ ce (see Skidmore 1988, pp.51-2). It appears that he
failed to do so in part due to the unpopularity of his economic policies among
military o¢ cers. Upon assuming presidency, Costa e Silva appointed Delm
Neto as nance minister, under whose economic management the Brazilian
economy grew rapidly.
The presidential succession after the incapacitation of Costa e Silva also
shows that the Brazilian armed forcesgrip on power was secure. Although
the Constitution stipulated that vice-president would succeed the incapac-
itated president, the military did not allow Vice President Pedro Aleixo, a
veteran Congressman, to take o¢ ce. Those outside the regime, including
Congressmen, had no say in leadership selection.
This episode is consistent with our theory in that successful autocracies
are those with the selectorate whose power is secure in the case of a leadership
replacement.
China (since September 1976) Since the death of Mao Zedong, who
had been Communist Party Chairman since the proclamation of Peoples Re-
public of China in 1949, China has been a stable autocratic regime according
to the Polity data set. As Tables 2 to 4 show, the communist regime of
50Keesings Contemporary Archives, pp.21063, 21939, 23706.
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China during this period has been successful in economic and human de-
velopment (though success in human development is less spectacular than
in Maos era). According to the Archigos data set, Hua Guofeng, Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao were the chief executives under this
regime.
Members of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party appear to
correspond to the selectorate in our theory. Formally, the Partys leader
(Party Chairman until 1982 and General Secretary afterwards) is elected by
the Central Committee of the Party whose several hundreds members are
in turn elected by the Party Congress. However, members of the Central
Committee are de facto appointed by around 20 members of the Politburo.51
After the death of Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng assumed party chairman-
ship by the Politburos appointment.52 During the subsequent years until his
resignation as Party Chairman in June of 1981, Huas power was gradually
transferred to Deng Xioaping, apparently because the Politburo members
were dissatised with Huas attempt to continue Maos policies (Lieberthal
2004, pp. 125-7). This gradual power transfer paralleled with the replace-
ment of Huas supporters with Dengs in the Politburo membership.53
As Deng never assumed leadership formally, it is hard to tell whether
members of the Politburo disciplined him during his rule. However, the
selection of General Secretary of the Party does appear to have been in the
hands of the Politburo. Hu Yaobang, Dengs designated successor and Gen-
eral Secretary since 1982, resigned in January of 1988, when several members
of the Politburo were dissatised with his economic policies and tolerance on
pro-democracy student protests.54 Zhao Ziang, who succeeded Hu as Gen-
eral Secretary, was in turn dismissed by the Politburo for similar reasons in
May of 1989.55
51See Lieberthal (2004, pp.173-5) for the formal organizational structure of the Party.
52See Keesings Contemporary Archives, pp.28205-7 and 28719.
53Dengs supporters (Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen)
joined the Politburo in December of 1978 (Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.30488).
Lieberthal (2004, p.126) regards Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian as
Politburo members supporting Hua. All of them resigned from the Politburo in February
of 1980 (Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.30498).
54See the account by Ruan (1994, pp. 165-9, 175-6), who was Hus friend.
55Keesings Record of World Events, p. 36640. An immediate reason for Zhaos dis-
missal was his support for pro-democracy student protests in Tianamen Square. However,
Zhaos support had already waned since late 1988 due to his too radical economic reform
causing ination. Also, Zhaos sons were alleged to be corrupt businessmen in Guangdon
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The handover of power from Deng to Jiang Zemin, who was appointed
as General Secretary in June of 1989, took place gradually.56 Jiang was for-
mally re-elected as General Secretary by the Central Committee in October
of 1992 and September of 1997. Given that Central Committee members
are e¤ectively appointed by the Politburo, the re-election of Jiang implies
that the Politburo supported him. In November of 2002, Hu Jintao became
General Secretary. Lieberthanl (2004, p.156) notes that Jiang reportedly
tried to convince his colleagues to allow him to stay on as General Secre-
tary. But he failed, indicating that members of the Politburo supported
Hus succession.
In every case of leadership succession over this period, the opposition to
the Communist Party rule did not manage to participate in leadership selec-
tion. In our models term,  (; ) was close to one because the opposition
group is e¤ectively disenfranchised (  1) and/or their voice counts little
(  0). When Zhao Ziang was dismissed in May of 1989, for example,
there had been student-led anti-government demonstrations in Beijing since
April. The communist government, however, managed to stay in power by
mobilizing the army to suppress the demonstrations (the Tiananmen Square
massacre).57
Overall, China since 1976 ts well with our model of autocracy and case
1 of Proposition 1.
Romania (January 1948 - January 1977) Since the proclamation
of Peoples Republic of Romania until Nicolae Ceausescu consolidated his
personal rule, Romanias communist rule is coded as one regime by the Polity
data set. According to the Archigos data set, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and
Nicolae Ceausescu were the rulers during this period. As Tables 2 to 4
show, the regimes performance is impressive in all the three dimensions of
development.
Top o¢ cials in the communist party are clearly the selectorate under
this regime. At a meeting in October of 1945, the partys central com-
mittee secretaries agreed that Gheorghiu-Dej became general secretary, the
top position to lead the party (Tismaneanu 2003, p.121). At the central
Province. See Gilley (1998, pp.129-31) and Lieberthal (2004, pp. 144-5).
56By the end of 1995, Deng was e¤ectively incapacitated and no longer commented on
policies (Gilley 1998, p.288).
57Keesings Record of World Events, pp. 36587, 36640, 36720.
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committee plenum in March of 1956, two members of the Politburo (Iosif
Chisinevschi and Miron Constantinescu) openly challenged Gheorghiu-Dejs
authority. When Gheorghiu-Dej died of lung cancer in March of 1965, mem-
bers of the Politburo chose Ceausescu as his successor (Ibid., pp.185-6).
It appears that Gheorghui-Dej decided to promote industrialization after
his Stalinist background became the source of criticism due to Khrushchevs
Secret Speech, denouncing Stalinism, in 1956. In this context, the leadership
challenge by Chisinevschi and Constantinescu, mentioned above, took place.
Determined to promote industrialization, he even resisted Khrushcevs plan
to transform Romania into the agricultural base in the Soviet bloc.58
Ceausescu continued this e¤ort of industrialization. By the time this
centrally-planned industrialization caused economic problems in the late 1970s,
however, Ceausescu managed to consolidate his power and established his
personal cult, appointing his wife as the number two in the communist party
hierarchy and promoting his son as heir-apparent.59 The selectorates grip on
power appears to have become dependent on Ceausescu, unable to discipline
his devastating economic policies in the 1980s.
Spain (April 1939 - November 1975) Franco ruled Spain during this
period (from the end of the Civil War until his death). Although the regime
began in 1939, the data that we used to identify Franco as an successful
autocrat comes from the 1950s at the earliest.
We are unable to nd any characteristics of Francos regime consistent
with our theory. The formal rule of leadership succession (Law of Succes-
sion), adopted in a popular referendum on July 6, 1947, stipulated that Spain
was a monarchy which Franco would govern until his death and that Franco
had the right to appoint his successor.60 Therefore, there was no selectorate,
at least formally.
58See Tismaneanu (2003, pp.142-180) for a series of events from the Secret Speech to
the adoption of industrialization plans.
59See Fischer (1989) for a series of events leading to the consolidation of Ceausescus
power. It is perhaps not just a coincidence that Ion Gheorghe Mauer and Emil Bon-
dras, two members of the politburo instrumental to the appointment of Ceausescu as
Gheorghiu-Dejs successor in 1965 (Tismaneanu 2003, pp.185-6), voluntarily resigned from
the politburo and died in o¢ ce, respectively, in the mid-1970 (Ibid., p.193), after which
Ceausescus rule became out of control of any member of the communist party.
60See Payne (1987, pp.372-5), Grugel and Rees (1997, pp.42-3), and Fusi (1987, pp.66-7)
for the background of the adoption of the Law of Succession.
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Francos regime supporters consist of Falangists (Spanish fascists), the
military, the Catholic church, and monarchists. These groups might be seen
as the selectorate, but there is little evidence that any of them seriously chal-
lenged Francos leadership (Grugel and Rees 1997, pp.30-43, 51-8). Francos
balancing act looks like the divide-and-rule tactic, which Acemoglu, Robin-
son, and Verdier (2004) identify as the source of long-lasting kleptocracy.
Given this personal-rule characteristics of the regime, Francos exibil-
ity on economic policies is remarkable. When the policy of an autarky and
import-substitution industrialization ended up with government decits, in-
ation, and current-account imbalances by the mid-1950s, culminating in
strikes and student protests, Franco shu­ ed the cabinet, appointing two
technocrats, Alberto Ullastres and Mariano Navarro Rubio, to economic min-
isters in 1957. When the two ministers proposed the abandonment of the au-
tarky policy and the plan for macroeconomic stabilization, Franco accepted
the proposal even though this was against Francos ideology (Payne 1987,
p.470). We cannot relate this policy change to the selectorates pressure on
Franco. If any, there appears to have been the pressure from the opposition
outside the regime protesting workers and students in the 1950s. Weirdly
enough, the logic of successful democracy in our model seems to apply here,
if not through regularized elections but through strikes and protests. Alter-
natively, Franco might have been a good policy maker in the terms of our
model.
South Korea (February 1973 - March 1981) According to the
Polity data set, South Korean military dictatorship, initiated by a coup in
1961, went through four changes of authority characteristics (1963, 1972,
1973, 1981).61 We have identied the fourth regime as the most success-
ful.62 During this period, Archigos identies four leaders ruling the country:
Park Chung Hee until his assassination in 1979, Choi Kyu Hah from 1979 to
61Park Chung Hee staged a military coup and became president in 1961; held multiparty
presidential elections and won in 1963; disbanded the national legislature, banned politi-
cal parties temporarily, and introduced the indirect presidential election by non-partisan
electoral college (see below for more detail) in 1972; and held multiparty legislative elec-
tions for the two-thirds of the seats in 1973 (the remaining one-third is appointed by the
president). In 1981, members of the electoral college were allowed to be a¢ liated with
political parties.
62Table 6 shows that, if we dene democracy as a regime with its Polity score larger
than 5, the second phase (1963-1972) is also a successful autocracy.
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1980, Park Chung Hun briey in 1980, and Chun Doo Hwan from 1980, who
continued to rule the country until 1988.
Formally, the selectorate was an electoral college, the National Conference
for Unication (NCU), whose members were elected by popular votes on a
non-partisan basis. The Constitution (proposed by Park Chung Hee and
approved in a referendum in November of 1972) stipulated that the NCU
would elect the President for six years with no term limits. Elections for
the NCU took place in December of 1972 (5,876 candidates contested the
2359 seats with 225 unopposed in their constituencies) and in May of 1978
(boycotted by opposition parties), both followed by the re-election of Park
as President.63 After Parks assassination, the NCU elected Choi Kyu Hah,
who had been Prime Minister since 1975, as new President in December of
1979. After the resignation of Choi in August of 1980, the NCU elected
Chun Doo Hwan as new President in the same month.64 It is not entirely
clear whether members of the NCU had any inuence on leadership selection,
however.65
Informally, the Korean CIA (KCIA), the regimes secret police organiza-
tion, could have been the selectorate. It was the KCIA chief who assassinated
Park in 1979. However, the assassins predecessors as the KCIA chief were
repeatedly purged by Park (Cli¤ord 1998, pp.80-90). There is little evidence
that anyone within the regime credibly threatened to oust Park.
A threat does appear to have come from those outside the regime, espe-
cially the opposition party leader Kim Dae-Jung.66 He ran for the presidency
in the 1971 election, only narrowly defeated by Park, even though Parks
export-led industrialization policy since the mid-1960s had been successful.
This electoral result appears to have prompted Park to abolish multiparty
direct presidential elections in 1972.67 We can interpret this series of events
in terms of our model. South Korea in the early 1970s could have been the
63See Keesings Contemporary Archives, pp.25747, 29795).
64Chun Doo Hwan seized the control of the military in December of 1979 and imposed
martial law in May 1980, shortly after which he became the head of an advisory body
(consisting of military o¢ cers) to President Choi. See Cli¤ord (1998, pp.143-163).
65We are unable to nd any scholarly research on the NCU, which Korea specialists
appear to dismiss as a rubber-stamping organization.
66Cli¤ord (1998, p.86) notes that, according to a former KCIA director, Park feared two
things: Kim Dae Jung and the U.S. Congress.
67Sohn (1989, pp.31-2) quotes Parks remark on the 1971 electoral result: ... I have
done my best to get rid of poverty. ... [D]o I deserve only this margin against Kim Dae
Jung?
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case of high polarization where (1  ) <  . Although the economy grew
rapidly and therefore the size of the pie to share among the population, T ,
became larger, workers did not benet much from it due to wage suppres-
sion by the regime.68 The opposition group, therefore, would never reward
the incumbents good behavior. Parks supporters including the business
community and Park himself if he was a good policy maker in the terms of
our model therefore preferred the autocratic regime in which the selectorate
could discipline the incumbent (or Park as a good policy maker could keep
choosing a good policy without being ousted).
5.2 Turnover
Our theory predicts that autocracies are successful if the selectorate can
credibly remove poorly-performing leaders. This implies that an autocratic
regime with a high rate of leadership change is more likely to be successful
on average than those with less turnover.69
To test this empirical implication, we obtain the number of leadership
changes for each autocratic regime, from the Archigos data set.70 We then
calculate the number of leadership changes per year for each regime. The
raw data support the idea that there are turnover di¤erences in successful and
unsuccessful autocracies (as identied in the base case of section 4.1 above).
The probability of turnover in a successful autocracy is 13% compared to
7% in an unsuccessful autocracy (the di¤erence being statistically signicant
at 5%). This implies that leaders in successful autocratic regimes spend on
average seven and half years in o¢ ce compared to nine years for unsuccessful
68See the account on worker protests in the early 1970s by Sohn (1989, pp.34-6).
69Note that if we look at the same successful autocratic regime over time, our theory
predicts the opposite: leadership change follows a bad performance. This prediction is not
what we try to provide empirical support for here. Also note that leadership turnover and
regime performance are jointly determined in our theoretical model. The aim of empirical
analysis in this subsection is, therefore, not to establish causality but to show correlations
which are consistent with our theory.
70We match POLITY IV and Archigos on a daily basis to avoid assigning leadership
changes to regimes that emerge later in the same year. If a leadership change and the
emergence of a new regime take place on the same date, we assign the leadership change to
the preceding regime. Finally, if the Archigos data set indicates that there is no national
leader, we regard only the beginning of such a period as a leadership change rather than
counting two leadership changes at the beginning and the end, because we are interested
in whether the selectorate can replace the incumbent.
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autocratic regimes. Interestingly, this contrasts with a much higher rate of
annual turnover of leaders (26%) in regimes classied as democracies implying
an average leadership tenure of just over four years.
To examine this further, we estimate equation (7) where Xc is replaced
with the number of leadership changes per year for regime i. Table 10
shows the estimated marginal e¤ect of the rate of leadership changes. The
dependent variable in column (1) is a dummy indicating economic success
(whether an autocratic regime is listed in Table 2). The higher rate of lead-
ership changes is signicantly associated with a higher likelihood of economic
success, consistent with our theoretical prediction. One standard deviation
of the number of leadership changes per year (0.11) changes the probability
of economic success by around 11 percentage points.
If we restrict economic success to robust cases, the signicant positive
correlation between leadership turnover and success remains (column (2)).
For success in health and education, however, columns (3) to (6) show no
signicant correlation between the rate of leadership changes and regime
performance. In column (7), the dependent variable is a dummy indicating
whether an autocratic regime is in the core set of successful ones identied
by Table 5. There is no correlation for this group either.71
In sum, this evidence suggestively supports a key idea from our theory
when economic success is used as the outcome. The results on health and
education suggest that the selectorate in autocracy is less responsive to lead-
ership performance in human development, perhaps because members of the
selectorate can privately a¤ord better health and education.
5.3 Death of Leader as a Natural Experiment
Our theory predicts that an autocracy is successful if the selectorates grip on
power is secure ( (; ) is high). More specically, an autocrat is disciplined
by the selectorate if overthrowing him does not lead to the seizure of power
by citizens outside the selectorate.
Observing  (; ) for each autocratic regime is not an easy task. We
may observe a leadership change in a poorly-performing autocracy with the
selectorate remaining in power afterwards. This may be interpreted as an
71These results are robust to excluding leadership changes due to natural causes (natural
deaths, resignation for health reasons, and suicides) from the calculation of the rate of
leadership turnover.
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unsuccessful autocracy with a high  (; ) which is apparently inconsistent
with our theory. However, it can also be interpreted as an equilibrium
outcome of our model where the policy maker chooses the bad policy and thus
gets removed from o¢ ce by the selectorate with a high  (; ). The problem
here is that leadership changes are endogenous to the regime performance.
However, if a leader dies or becomes incapacitated due to natural causes,
whether the selectorate remains in power afterwards does indicate  (; ).
Our theory, therefore, predicts that an autocratic regime performs well if a
random death or incapacitation of the leader does not lead to the loss of
power by the selectorate. It also should be the case that after a poorly-
performing dictator dies due to natural causes, the selectorate is likely to
change afterwards.72
Table 11 shows the list of autocratic regimes (with data on either growth,
health, or education) under which the chief executive died in o¢ ce due to
natural causes, according to the Archigos data set. Among the core set
of successful autocracies identied in Table 5, regimes in China, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Thailand went through a natural death of the
leader. We already saw above that the deaths of Deng Xiaoping in China
and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in Romania did not lead to the loss of power by
the selectorate, indicating that these two regimes had a high value of  (; )
and this might have allowed the selectorate to discipline their leader. We
nd that Portugal and Thailand are also consistent with our theory.73 To
see whether unsuccessful autocracies confronted with a random death reveal
a poorly entrenched selectorate, we also look at Guinea.
We proceed as follows. For each autocratic regime, we (i) describe the
performance of an autocrat who died in o¢ ce; (ii) identify the selectorate
under the dead leaders rule; and (iii) investigate whether the selectorate
remained in power after the death.
Portugal (July 1930 - April 1974) Prime Minister Oliveira Salazar
su¤ered a cerebral thrombosis and hemorrhage, lapsing into a coma on Sep-
tember 16 of 1968.74 Salazar had been premier since 1932. His rule was
72Jones and Olken (2005) rst exploit the random death of leaders as a natural experi-
ment.
73A random death in Poland occurred before we observe performance measures. The
death of Franco in Spain does not t with our theory as it led to democratization.
74Salazar was alive until 1970. Wiarda (1977, footnote 3 in Chapter 9) notes, however,
that he no longer made decisions and ... had no impact on the policies of the new
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successful in economic growth and health production as seen in Table 6.
The selectorate under Salazars rule appears to be the armed forces.75
Before Salazar became prime minister in 1932, the armed forces had con-
trolled the government since its seizure of power in 1926. The Constitution
of 1933 stipulated that the ceremonial president had the power to appoint
and remove premiers, and the post of presidency was consistently given to
military men (Wiarda 1977, pp. 100, 122-3).
The armed forces retained the control of the country after Salazars inca-
pacitation (Wiarda 1977, pp. 253-4). President Americo Thomaz, a retired
admiral, summoned the Council of State, a constitutional advisory body con-
sisting of the nations prominent gures, and also met with other powerful
gures of the regime. On September 26, Thomaz announced publicly that
he released Salazar from his post and appointed Marcello Caetano as prime
minister. Caetano remained in power until 1974.76
This sequence of events after the incapacitation of Salazar indicates that
the selectorates grip on power was rather secure. Salazar, whose rule could
be seen as personal rule, may have actually been disciplined by the military,
and thus had an incentive to promote economic development and improve
peoples health.
Thailand (October 1958 - February 1968) Prime Minister Sarit
Thanarat died from heart and lung ailments on December 8, 1963 (Lentz
1994, p.749). Sarit, a military o¢ cer, seized power in a bloodless coup in
October of 1958. His dictatorial rule since then performed well in economic
growth and health production.77
The selectorate under Sarits regime appears to be King Bhumibol Adulyadej
and the military. In February of 1959, Sarit was formally elected prime min-
ister by the Constituent Assembly whose members were appointed by royal
government.
75Maxwell (1986, p.112) provides an alternative view, however, by noting that "[t]he
Portuguese dictatorship was preeminently civilian and legalistic.
76Maxwell (1986, p.112) notes that the appointment of Caetano as premier was condi-
tional on his acceptance of the militarys position on what to do with Portugals territories
in Africa. This further suggests that the selectorate was the military.
77Thailands economic growth rate from 1958 to 1962 is 5.5 percent. Life expectancy
at birth conditional on real GDP per capita is 11.4 years (the average of 1960 and 1962),
comparable to the whole regime performance (see Table 3). Sarit does not enter Table 6
because his rule did not last more than ve full calendar years.
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decree.78 According to Chaloemtiarana (2007, p.187), 152 out of the 220
members of the Assembly were military o¢ cers. Chaloemtiarana (2007,
chapter 6) argues that Sarit needed the support from the military and the
king. The support from the king appears to have been the most crucial for
Sarit, as he accorded the throne much more power and prestige than [his]
predecessors hadto seek the military regimes legitimacy (Ibid., p.205).
After the death of Sarit, the selectorate remained the same. The kings
inuence got even stronger. ThanomKittikachorn, a military o¢ cer who had
been Deputy Minister and Defence Minister since 1959, succeeded Sarit by
King Bhumibols appointment.79 Thanom turned increasingly to the king
for support and advice(Ibid., p.217). The military had the last say in keep-
ing Thanom in power. When Thanoms government faced student demon-
strations in 1973, the military refused to suppress them, forcing Thanom to
ee the country (Nelson 2001, p.262).80
The above episode suggests that the selectorate the king and the mili-
tary had a tight grip on power. Our theory implies that this allowed them
to credibly threaten to oust Sarit or Thanom in the case of a poor perfor-
mance. Impressive performance of the Thai military regime by Sarit and
Thanom on economic growth and health may have been due to the discipline
imposed by the king and the military.
Guinea (October 1958 - April 1984) On March 26 of 1984, Presi-
dent Ahmed Sekou Toure died in an US hospital to which he was taken by air
from Guinea after su¤ering a heart attack on the day before.81 Sekou Toure
ruled Guinea since its independence. As Table 11 shows, the performance
of his rule is miserable: a negative economic growth rate (-0.67%), lower life
expectancy and lower primary school enrollment compared to countries with
the same level of real GDP per capita.82
78Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.16691.
79Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.19814.
80Although the Polity dataset codes 1968 as the end of Thai military regime, Thanom
remained in power by holding multiparty parliamentary elections in which his party won.
He then dissolved the parliament and banned political parties in 1971, restoring the mili-
tary dictatorship.
81Africa Research Bulletin, March 1-31, 1984, p.7178.
82Kaba (1977, p.40) lists Sekou Toures failures in health production: the shortage of
hospital beds in the capital city, the appointment of inexperienced individuals to hospital
administration, medicine shortage, and Sekou Toures denial of a cholera epidemic in 1973.
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The ruling selectorate appears to have been members of the political
bureau of the sole legal party, the Parti Democratique de Guinea (PDG).83
By Constitution, the political bureau of the PDG would meet to choose a
new leader within 45 days after the incapacitation of the president.84
After the death of Sekou Toure, Prime Minister Lansana Beavogui became
interim president and was supposed to succeed formally by the appointment
of the PDG political bureau.85 On April 3, however, young military o¢ -
cers staged a bloodless coup with Colonel Lansana Conte becoming a new
president. The PDG was then dissolved.
This episode indicates that the selectorate, the PDG political bureau,
stayed in power solely due to Sekou Toures presence. They plausibly ex-
pected that they would lose power if they removed Sekou Toure ( (; ) t 0).
This lack of secure power on the part of the selectorate may explain why
Sekou Toure performed so badly while remaining in o¢ ce.86
5.4 Summary
This tour of the evidence conducted through the lens of our model is sketchy.
However, it does breathe life into the institutional setting that we modeled.
The case studies suggest that the power of the selectorate and their role
in disciplining poorly performing leaders could be a force in shaping the
performance of autocracy in the absence of an electoral sanction. This leads
to more turnover on average in successful autocracies than in unsuccessful
ones.
83Sekou Toure was a founding-member of the PDG and became Secretary General of
the Party in 1952 (Johnson 1970, p.350). In 1957, the PDG won multiparty elections
for the Territorial Assembly under French rule. In November of 1958, one month after
independence, the PDG became the sole legal party by Constitution (see Brune 1999).
84Keesings Record of World Events, p.32955.
85According to Momoh (1984), the powerful Toure family including the ambitious
Minister of Mines and Geology, Ismael Toure, had persuaded ... Beavogui to accept the
post of acting president. ... Beavougui, as it was understood, would have held the post
for two or three years...
86According to Jackson and Rosberg (1982, p.210), Guinea under Sekou Toures rule
saw persistent attempts by the government to hold to the rulers ideological approach
while ignoring the lessons to be learned from economic and planning failures.
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6 Conclusion
This paper is a contribution to on-going debates about the institutional basis
of successful government. It tries to understand di¤erences between good
and bad autocracies in terms of the forces that shape accountability in the
absence of regularized elections. It does so in three steps. The rst has
been to develop a simple model of incentives to generate good policy when
the decision to retain the leader is vested in a selectorate comprising citizens
from some ruling group. Second, it has identied successful autocracies
using objective empirical criteria. Third, it has used the group of autocracies
identied from this exercise as a basis for case studies in successful autocracy
with a view to matching the theory to real world experience.
Our modeling approach makes clear that democracies can be better or
worse than autocracies in terms of accountability although it suggests a pre-
sumption in favour of democracy on this basis. This is consistent with the
raw data. In our model, successful autocracies are those where poor quality
leadership leads to removal of leaders from o¢ ce. While it is asking too
much of a simple theory to do justice to the richness of the real world expe-
rience, we nd some suggestive evidence that the forces shaping leadership
replacement in the way that the model suggests may be at work in success-
ful autocracies. Leadership turnover is greater in successful compared to
unsuccessful autocracies. Moreover, studying the sample of successful au-
tocracies that handled leadership deaths from natural causes reinforces the
view that successful autocracies are those where the ruling group has a hold
over power.
The analysis in this paper is a rst step in a wider project. It seems
essential in collecting data that characterizes di¤erences in political regimes
to be guided by what theory suggests could be important. Among the
large array of impressive data collection exercises, there is very little that
provides a persuasive mapping between things that shape political incentives
and outcomes. For a broad category like autocracy, it is essential to bridge
this gap more in future work to understand the lessons for the genesis of
good government.
This paper provides a complement to other on-going work in this area.
The approach emphasizes the value of rooting our understanding in simple
theoretical models, not least as a lens to focus empirical exercises. It also
suggests a way of applying agency models to the democracy-autocracy com-
parison which may have other fruitful applications. While it is evident that
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much remains to be done to bring theory and data together in understanding
the forces that shape the quality of government, the theoretical tools that are
being developed in political economy and the rich data now available provide
a secure starting point for this endeavour.
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Figure 1: Economic Growth Distributions among Democracies and Autocracies 
 
Sources: Penn World Table 6.2 and POLITY IV (version 2004) 
Notes: Plotted are the density functions estimated by using the Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth 
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Figure 2: Health Performance Distributions among Democracies and 
Autocracies 
 
Sources: World Development Indicators (September 2006), Penn World Table 6.2, Statistical 
Yearbook of the Republic of China (1987, 2005), and POLITY IV (version 2004) 
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Figure 3: Education Performance Distributions among Democracies and 
Autocracies 
 
Sources: UNESCO Institute of Statistics, Penn World Table 6.2, Statistical Yearbook of the 
Republic of China (1994, 2005), and POLITY IV (version 2004) 
Notes: See Figure 1. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Autocracy and Democracy
Good Democracy: Bad Democracy:
τ ≤ (1− pi)∆ τ > (1− pi)∆
Good Autocracy: Democracy Autocracy
(1− Γ(φ, υ))τ < pi∆ if Γ(φ, υ) > γ(β)
Bad Autocracy: Democracy Democracy
(1− Γ(φ, υ))τ ≥ pi∆ if γ(β) > 0
1
Table 2: Economically Successful Autocracies





Equatorial Guinea(1996-2004) 1996-2003 28.04% Y Y Y
Rwanda(1994-2000) 1994-1999 12.56% Y Y N
Gabon(1960-1968) 1960-1967 8.59% Y Y -
Belarus(1996-2004) 1996-2003 8.15% N Y -
Liberia(1997-2003) 1997-2002 7.94% Y Y Y
China(1976-2004) 1976-2004 7.87% Y Y -
Greece(1967-1974) 1967-1973 7.85% Y Y Y
Ecuador(1972-1979) 1972-1978 7.73% Y Y Y
Romania(1948-1977) 1960-1976 7.63% Y Y -
South Korea(1981-1987) 1981-1986 7.23% Y Y Y
Azerbaijan(1998-2004) 1998-2003 7.15% Y Y Y
Taiwan(1975-1987) 1975-1986 6.81% N Y -
Niger(1974-1981) 1974-1981 6.27% Y Y N
Iraq(1968-1979) 1970-1978 6.17% Y Y -
Taiwan(1949-1975) 1951-1974 5.98% N Y -
Brazil(1965-1974) 1965-1973 5.89% Y Y Y
Spain(1939-1975) 1950-1974 5.77% Y Y -
Poland(1947-1980) 1970-1979 5.76% Y Y -
Portugal(1930-1974) 1950-1973 5.75% Y Y -
Togo(1960-1967) 1960-1966 5.68% Y Y -
South Korea(1973-1981) 1973-1980 5.50% N Y Y
Thailand(1958-1968) 1958-1967 5.34% Y Y Y
Venezuela(1941-1958) 1950-1957 4.93% Y Y -
Singapore(1965-2004) 1965-2004 4.80% N Y -
Indonesia(1967-1998) 1967-1997 4.56% Y Y -
Vietnam(1976-2004) 1989-2003 4.47% N Y -
Bhutan(1953-2004) 1970-2003 4.28% N Y -
China(1969-1976) 1969-1975 4.04% N Y N
Iran(1955-1979) 1955-1978 4.01% Y Y -
Tunisia(1971-1981) 1971-1980 3.86% N N Y
Syria(1963-1970) 1963-1969 3.82% Y Y Y
North Korea(1966-2004) 1970-2003 3.75% N Y -
Peru(1950-1956) 1950-1955 3.73% Y N -
Pakistan(1977-1985) 1977-1984 3.70% Y Y Y
UAE(1971-2004) 1971-2003 3.70% N N -
Notes : "Years of Observations" indicate the period for which the annual economic 
growth rate is calculated. Robustness 1 is "Y" if the regime's growth rate minus the 
country average is above the 80 percentile of the distribution; "N" otherwise. 
Robustness 2 is "Y" if the regime's growth rate minus the average among regimes 
in the same initial income quintile is above the 80 percentile; "N" otherwise. 
Robustness 3 is "Y" if the growth rate during the 3-year period preceding the 
regime is positive; "N" if negative; and "-" either if the regime lasted 10 years or 
longer or if there is no data on GDP for the preceding period. 
Table 3: Autocracies Successful in Health Production




Cuba(1961-1976) 1970-1972 17.48 Y N
Romania(1948-1977) 1960-1972 17.48 Y Y
Taiwan(1949-1975) 1960-1972 16.34 Y Y
China(1969-1976) 1970-1972 13.89 N Y
Poland(1947-1980) 1970-1977 12.68 Y Y
China(1976-2004) 1977-2004 12.43 N Y
Paraguay(1954-1967) 1960-1962 12.28 Y N
Syria(1970-2000) 1972-1997 11.89 N N
Azerbaijan(1998-2004) 2000-2003 11.83 N Y
Vietnam(1976-2004) 1990-2003 11.49 N Y
North Korea(1966-2004) 1970-2003 11.35 N Y
Cuba(1977-2004) 1980-2003 11.22 N N
Panama(1969-1978) 1970-1977 11.03 Y N
Thailand(1958-1968) 1960-1967 10.69 Y Y
Taiwan(1975-1987) 1977-1985 10.08 Y Y
Jordan(1992-2004) 1995-2003 9.67 Y N
Morocco(1998-2004) 2000-2003 8.73 Y N
Paraguay(1967-1989) 1970-1987 8.49 N N
Kyrgyzstan(1991-2004) 1995-2002 8.09 N N
Greece(1967-1974) 1970-1972 7.88 Y Y
South Korea(1973-1981) 1977-1980 7.80 Y Y
Chile(1973-1981) 1977-1980 7.67 Y N
Uzbekistan(1991-2004) 1997-2003 7.58 N N
Spain(1939-1975) 1960-1972 6.80 Y Y
Morocco(1992-1998) 1995-1997 6.79 Y N
Syria(1963-1970) 1967 6.39 N Y
Portugal(1930-1974) 1960-1972 6.15 Y Y
Tunisia(1987-1993) 1990-1992 6.08 N N
Algeria(1995-2004) 1997-2003 6.00 Y N
Iraq(1979-2003) 1980-1997 5.85 N N
Tunisia(1993-2002) 1995-2000 5.82 N N
Notes : "Years of Observations" indicate the first and last years of observations on life expectancy at birth for 
each regime. "Conditional Life Expectancy" is the number of years in life expectancy at birth unexplained by the 
Preston curve (the quadratic function of per capita real GDP). "Robustness" is "Y" if the regime is above the 80 
percentile of the distribution of conditional life expectancy minus the country average; "N" otherwise. 
"Economic Success" is "Y" if the regime appears in Table 2; "N" otherwise.
Table 4: Autocracies Successful in Education




Equatorial Guinea(1969-1993) 1990 81.55 Y N
Congo-Brazzaville(1963-1979) 1970-1975 57.44 Y N
Congo-Brazzaville(1979-1991) 1980-1990 50.68 Y N
Cuba(1961-1976) 1970-1975 48.13 Y N
Brazil(1965-1974) 1970 42.25 Y Y
Uganda(1996-2004) 1999-2003 40.87 Y N
China(1969-1976) 1970-1975 38.01 N Y
Romania(1948-1977) 1970-1975 34.27 Y Y
Madagascar(1975-1991) 1980-1990 32.39 Y N
Mongolia(1952-1990) 1970-1985 31.72 Y N
China(1976-2004) 1980-2004 30.98 N Y
Panama(1969-1978) 1970-1975 29.78 Y N
Spain(1939-1975) 1970 29.58 Y Y
Lesotho(1973-1986) 1975-1985 29.40 N N
Peru(1968-1976) 1970-1975 28.87 N N
Philippines(1972-1981) 1975-1980 28.59 N N
Togo(1979-1991) 1980-1990 28.12 N N
Laos(1975-2004) 1980-2003 27.62 N N
Equatorial Guinea(1996-2004) 1999-2002 26.74 N Y
Mexico(1930-1977) 1970-1975 25.41 Y N
South Korea(1973-1981) 1975-1980 24.98 Y Y
Ecuador(1972-1979) 1975 24.60 N Y
Gabon(1991-2004) 1999-2004 24.52 N N
Dominican Republic(1966-1978) 1970-1975 24.41 Y N
Mexico(1977-1988) 1980-1985 23.96 Y N
Zimbabwe(1987-2000) 1990-1999 23.77 N N
Tunisia(1981-1987) 1985 23.77 Y N
Indonesia(1967-1998) 1970-1996 23.64 N Y
Chile(1973-1981) 1975-1980 23.15 Y N
Togo(1993-2004) 1994-2004 22.77 N N
Paraguay(1967-1989) 1970-1985 22.29 N N
Vietnam(1976-2004) 1990-2003 22.13 N Y
Cameroon(1966-1972) 1970 21.82 Y N
Syria(1970-2000) 1975-1999 21.03 N N
Notes : "Years of Observations" indicate the first and last years of observations on gross primary school enrollment 
ratio for each regime. "Conditional Enrollment Ratio" is the percentage points in gross primary school enrollment 
ratio unexplained by the quadratic function of per capita real GDP. "Robustness" is "Y" if the regime is above the 
80 percentile of the distribution of conditional enrollment ratio minus the country average; "N" otherwise. 
"Economic Success" is "Y" if the regime appears in Table 2; "N" otherwise.
Table 5: Core Set of Successful Autocracies
Regime Score Economic Growth Health EducationSuccess? Robust? Success? Robust? Success? Robust?
Romania(1948-1977) 6 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Spain(1939-1975) 6 Y Y Y Y Y Y
South Korea(1973-1981) 5 Y N Y Y Y Y
Brazil(1965-1974) 4 Y Y N - Y Y
Chile(1973-1981) 4 N - Y Y Y Y
China(1976-2004) 4 Y Y Y N Y N
Cuba(1961-1976) 4 N - Y Y Y Y
Greece(1967-1974) 4 Y Y Y Y N -
Panama(1969-1978) 4 N - Y Y Y Y
Poland(1947-1980) 4 Y Y Y Y N -
Portugal(1930-1974) 4 Y Y Y Y N -
Thailand(1958-1968) 4 Y Y Y Y - -
Notes : For each performance measure (Economic Growth, Health, Education), "Success?" is "Y" if the regime's 
performance is above the 80 percentile, "N" if not, and "-" if data is unavailable. For Economic Growth, "Robust?" is 
"Y" if the regime does not fail to pass the three robustness checks shown in Table 2, "N" if it does, and "-" if "Success?" 
is "N". For Health and Education, "Robust?" is "Y" if the regime passes the robustness check of subtracting the country 
average (see Tables 3 and 4), "N" if it does not, and "-" if "Success?" is "N". "Score" is calculated as the number of "Y" 
in each row.
Table 6: Successful Autocrats




Success? Robust? Success? Robust?
Rwanda 1994-2004 Paul Kagame 10.19% N N - N -
China 1980-1997 Deng Xiaoping 8.51% Y Y Y Y N
Equatorial Guinea 1969-1979 Macias Nguema 8.07% Y N - - -
Liberia 1997-2003 Charles Taylor 7.94% Y N - N -
Greece 1967-1973 Papadopoulos 7.90% Y Y Y N -
South Korea 1972-1979 Park Chung Hee 7.74% Y Y Y Y Y
Belarus 1995-2004 Lukashenko 7.23% N N - N -
China 1997-2003 Jiang Zemin 7.20% Y Y N Y N
Portugal 1968-1974 Caetano 7.03% Y Y Y N -
Equatorial Guinea 1979-2004 Nguema Mbasogo 7.02% N N - Y N
South Korea 1980-1987 Chun Doo Hwan 6.61% Y N - N -
Taiwan 1978-1988 Chiang Ching-Kuo 6.25% N Y N N -
Iraq 1968-1979 Hassan Al-Bakr 6.17% Y N - N -
Swaziland 1968-1982 Subhuza II 6.14% Y N - N -
Taiwan 1950-1975 Chiang Kai-shek 5.98% N Y Y - -
Nicaragua 1947-1956 Anastasio Somoza Garcia 5.91% Y - - - -
North Korea 1948-1994 Kim Il-Sung 5.83% Y Y N - -
Spain 1939-1975 Franco 5.77% Y Y Y Y Y
Singapore 1965-1990 Lee Kuan Yew 5.77% N N - N -
Poland 1970-1980 Gierek 5.76% Y Y Y N -
Romania 1965-1989 Ceausescu 5.68% Y Y N Y Y
Vietnam 1991-1997 Do Muoi 5.55% N Y N Y Y
Portugal 1932-1968 Salazar 5.01% N Y Y - -
Venezuela 1950-1958 Perez Jimenez 4.93% Y - - - -
Qatar 1995-2004 Amad Al Thani 4.87% Y N - N -
Bhutan 1972-1998 Jigme Singye Wangchuck 4.83% N N - - -
Mexico 1976-1982 Lopez Portillo 4.63% Y N - Y Y
Indonesia 1966-1998 Suharto 4.30% N N - Y N
Iran 1989-1997 Rafsanjani 4.17% Y N - N -
Congo-Brazzaville 1969-1977 Ngouabi 4.16% Y N - Y Y
Iran 1955-1979 Mohammad Reza 4.01% N N - N -
Pakistan 1977-1988 Zia 3.78% Y N - N -
Nigeria 1966-1975 Gowon 3.73% Y N - N -
Peru 1950-1956 Odria 3.73% N - - - -
UAE 1971-2004 An-Nahayan 3.70% N N - N -
Panama 1968-1981 Torrijos Herrera 3.68% N Y Y Y Y
Mexico 1952-1958 Ruiz Cortines 3.65% N - - - -
Notes : Included in the list are autocrats under whose rule annual growth rate exceeds the 80 percentile of the distribution. "Years" indicate the 
period in which an autocrat rules the country non-democratically. "Robust for Growth?" is "Y" if an autocrat's rule does not fail to pass the three 
robustness checks described in the note for Table 2. For columns titled Health and Education, see the note for Table 5.





Success? Robust? Success? Robust?
South Korea(1963-1972) 6.57% Y Y Y Y Y
Greece(1949-1967) 5.33% Y Y Y - -
Pakistan(1962-1969) 4.66% Y N - - -
Malaysia(1971-1995) 4.63% N N - N -
Turkey(1954-1960) 4.55% Y - - - -
France(1958-1969) 4.27% Y N - - -
Cambodia(1998-2004) 4.14% Y N - Y N
Brazil(1947-1958) 3.77% N - - - -
Sri Lanka(1982-2001) 3.62% N Y N Y N
Thailand(1978-1988) 3.59% N Y N N -
Notes : Listed in the table are regimes with their Polity score between 1 and 5 inclusive whose annual 
economnic growth exceeds the 80 percentile of the distribution. See also notes for Table 5 for the last 
five columns in the table.









PartiesSuccess? Robust? Success? Robust?
Botswana(1966-1990) 7.90% N Y N N - Indirect Elective 2+
Ecuador(1972-1979) 7.73% Y N - N - Non-elective No legislature 2+
South Korea(1981-1988) 7.67% Y N - N - Direct Elective 1
South Korea(1973-1980) 7.41% Y Y Y Y Y Indirect Elective 2+
Jordan(1955-1966) 7.21% Y N - N - Non-elective Elective 0
Singapore(1965-1981) 7.05% N N - N - Indirect Elective 1
Iraq(1963-1980) 6.77% Y Y N N - Non-elective No legislature 1
South Korea(1963-1972) 6.57% N Y Y Y Y Direct Elective 2+
Taiwan(1952-1990) 6.20% N Y N N - Indirect Elective 2+
Portugal(1951-1974) 5.60% Y N - N - Indirect Elective 1
Romania(1961-1990) 5.31% N Y N N - Non-elective Elective 1
China(1961-1990) 5.18% N Y N Y N Non-elective Elective 1
Spain(1951-1977) 5.01% N N - N - Non-elective Non-elective 1
Niger(1974-1983) 4.96% N N - N - Non-elective No legislature 0
Morocco(1956-1963) 4.85% Y N - N - Non-elective No legislature 2+
Thailand(1957-1969) 4.71% N Y Y N - Non-elective No legislature 0
Togo(1961-1967) 4.70% Y N - N - Indirect Elective 1
Panama(1978-1984) 4.67% Y Y N N - Indirect Elective 0
Pakistan(1962-1969) 4.66% Y N - N - Indirect Elective 2+
Singapore(1981-1990) 4.35% N N - N - Indirect Elective 2+
Malaysia(1971-1990) 4.31% N Y N N - Indirect Elective 2+
Iran(1963-1979) 4.28% N N - N - Non-elective Elective 1
Uruguay(1976-1982) 4.11% Y N - N - Non-elective No legislature 0
Indonesia(1971-1990) 4.02% N N - Y N Indirect Elective 1
Lesotho(1970-1984) 3.95% N N - Y N Non-elective Non-elective 1
Philippines(1972-1978) 3.93% N N - Y Y Direct No legislature 0
Syria(1963-1970) 3.82% Y Y N N - Non-elective No legislature 1
Egypt(1979-1990) 3.34% N N - N - Direct Elective 2+
Successful in Human Development only
Panama(1969-1978) 2.59% - Y Y Y Y Non-elective No legislature 0
Togo(1979-1990) -3.76% - Y Y Y Y Direct Elective 1
Notes : Listed in the table are autocracies, as defined by Przeworski et al. (2000), whose annual economic growth exceeds the 80 percentile of the 
distribution. Also included are autocracies successful in human development only (the last two rows). "Executive Selection" indicates how the chief 
executive is chosen (Non-elective: assuming power without elections; Indirect: elected by legislature; Direct: elected by popular votes); "Legislative 
Selection" indicates how legislative members are chosen (No legislature: there is no legislature; Non-elective: appointed by the executive or hereditary 
succession; elective: elected by popualr votes); "Number of Parties" indicates the number of legal political parties. These three columns are obtained from 
Przeworski et al. (2000). For the rest of the columns, see notes for Table 5.
Table 9: Exogenous Country Characteristics and Successful Autocracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Growth Growth Growth Health Health Education Education Core Core
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.12 -0.54** -0.01 -0.35
[0.16] [0.25] [0.19] [0.47]
Log European Settlers' Mortality -0.0270 0.0377
[0.0336] [0.1599]
French Legal Origin -0.10 0.12 0.89***
[0.25] [0.09] [0.11]
Socialist Legal Origin 0.52* 0.40 0.98***
[0.28] [0.30] [0.02]
German Legal Origin 0.59*** -0.16 0.78***
[0.15] [0.11] [0.08]
Oil Price Boom -0.02**
[0.01]
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Decade dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 176 74 170 89 90 148 149 38 19
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.15 0.30 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.32 0.12
Notes: Reported are the marginal effect for continuous regressors and the discrete change in the probability of success for dummy regressors (legal 
origins), both evaluated at the mean of all regressors. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The unit of observation is an autocratic regime. 
The dependent variables are: a dummy for success in economic growth (included in Table 2) in columns (1)-(3); a dummy for success in health 
production (included in Table 3) in columns (4)-(5); a dummy for success in education (included in Table 4) in columns (6)-(7); and a dummy for 
being included in the core set of successful autocracies (Table 5). "Decade dummies" refer to dummies indicating the decade in which the regime 
begins (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, with decades before 1960 omitted). "Region dummies" include East Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean (with Western Europe omitted). Depending 
on the specification, some dummies perfectly predict the dependent variable, which causes reductions in the number of observations.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 10: Leadership Turnover and Successful Autocracies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)















# of leadership changes per year 0.99*** 0.61*** -0.22 -0.34 -0.29 0.08 0.09
[0.28] [0.20] [0.57] [0.58] [0.38] [0.28] [0.96]
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Decade dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 177 177 90 84 149 149 38
Pseudo R-squared 0.31 0.26 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.23
Notes: Reported are the marginal effect evaluated at the mean of all regressors. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The unit of 
observation is an autocratic regime. The dependent variables are: in column (1), a dummy for being included in Table 2; in column (2), a 
dummy for being included in Table 2 and not failing to pass any robustness checks; in column (3) a dummy for being included in Table 3; in 
column (4), a dummy for being included in Table 3 and passing the robustness check; in column (5) a dummy for being included in Table 4; 
in column (6), a dummy for being included in Table 4 and passing the robustness check; in column (7), a dummy for being included in Table 
5. See Table 9 for details on decade and region dummies.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%






Economic Growth Conditional Life 
Expectancy
Health Conditional Enrollment 
Ratio
Education
Success? Robust? Success? Robust? Success? Robust?
Romania(1948-1977) 1965 6 7.63% Y Y 17.48 Y Y 34.27 Y Y
Spain(1939-1975) 1975 6 5.77% Y Y 6.80 Y Y 29.58 Y Y
China(1976-2004) 1997 4 7.87% Y Y 12.43 Y N 30.98 Y N
Poland(1947-1980) 1956 4 5.76% Y Y 12.68 Y Y 19.82 N -
Portugal(1930-1974) 1968 4 5.75% Y Y 6.15 Y Y 8.46 N -
Thailand(1958-1968) 1963 4 5.34% Y Y 10.69 Y Y - -
China(1969-1976) 1976 3 4.04% Y N 13.89 Y N 38.01 Y N
Taiwan(1949-1975) 1975 3 5.98% Y N 16.34 Y Y - -
Taiwan(1975-1987) 1978 3 6.81% Y N 10.08 Y Y 5.56 N -
Vietnam(1976-2004) 1986 3 4.47% Y N 11.49 Y N 22.13 Y N
Gabon(1960-1968) 1967 2 8.59% Y Y -26.81 N - - -
Jordan(1992-2004) 1999 2 0.89% N - 9.67 Y Y -6.92 N -
Morocco(1998-2004) 1999 2 1.19% N - 8.73 Y Y 2.24 N -
North Korea(1966-2004) 1994 2 3.75% Y N 11.35 Y N - -
Syria(1970-2000) 2000 2 2.18% N - 11.89 Y N 21.03 Y N
Bhutan(1953-2004) 1972 1 4.28% Y N 0.92 N - - -
Lao PDR(1975-2004) 1992 1 1.35% N - -3.72 N - 27.62 Y N
Algeria(1965-1989) 1978 0 1.35% N - -0.75 N - 4.01 N -
Egypt(1952-1976) 1970 0 1.29% N - -0.20 N - -3.77 N -
Guinea(1958-1984) 1984 0 -0.67% N - -14.59 N - -44.54 N -
Haiti(1961-1971) 1971 0 - - -3.24 N - -15.74 N -
Iran(1982-1997) 1989 0 0.86% N - 1.78 N - 11.13 N -
Kenya(1969-1979) 1978 0 -0.47% N - 3.66 N - 12.64 N -
Kuwait(1965-1971) 1965 0 - - 2.25 N - 8.57 N -
Liberia(1909-1980) 1971 0 -1.13% N - -9.03 N - -35.24 N -
Mauritania(1962-1991) 1979 0 -0.19% N - -5.44 N - -42.17 N -
Nepal(1962-1981) 1972 0 0.49% N - -4.75 N - -18.18 N -
Nicaragua(1936-1979) 1966 0 2.45% N - -7.86 N - -6.87 N -
Saudi Arabia(1926-2004) 1953,1982 0 0.20% N - -12.30 N - -40.52 N -
Swaziland(1973-1993) 1982 0 3.31% N - -9.63 N - 10.28 N -
Notes : Listed are autocratic regimes under which the chief executive died in office due to natural causes. "Year of Leader's Death" indicates the year of such death. For the rest 
of the columns, see notes for Tables 3 to 5.
